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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PLATTED LANDS ISSUE
The problem of what can be done with previously subdivided
land which has not yet been constructed upon or built out, and
which no longer complies with subdivision rules and regulations,
has become quite serious in jurisdictions all over the United
States. Real estate in many areas was platted in small-lot residen-
tial subdivisions with little consideration for the impact on water
supply, sewage disposal, transportation, etc., which would accom-
pany build-out. When initially platted, these subdivisions were the
dream of real estate developers. Today, these areas present numer-
ous current and potential problems. An increasing influx of settlers
has awakened a recognition that some remedial measures must be
initiated to protect not only those who have already moved in, but
also those who have invested in a lot and hope someday to retire
there or sell the lot for profit.
This article examines the range of legal issues raised by selected
public responses to such problems. These responses include actions
by which government may require or encourage the modification,
deplatting, or restriction of the use of existing platted lands. The
article also explores the legal issues raised by options which would
allow new development through reassembly. It does this in the
context of the general Florida experience and in the specific con-
text of the three county Charlotte Harbor area (see Figure 1). The
analysis, however, is generally applicable, and the discussion high-
lights options available based upon the experience of other juris-
dictions.1 The approach is comprehensive, and it is hoped that this
article will serve as a reference guide to those in both public and
private sectors seeking management solutions to equitably deal
with the myriad of problems created by large scale subdivisions.
This article is organized into three sections (each further subdi-
vided) and a conclusion. The first section contains introductory
material addressing the general character of the three county area
and the concerns posed by large subdivisions sold by lot.2 Section
1. The research includes both federal and Florida law, and discusses the experience of
other selected jurisdictions which have addressed similar problems.
2. The information presented in the introductory section is derived primarily from per-
sonal interviews with informed individuals in the Charlotte Harbor area, as well as from
information contained in SOUTHWEST FLORIDA REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL (SWFRPC),
LAND USE POLICY PLAN (1980); and CHARLOTTE HARBOR: A FLORIDA RESOURCE (1980). The
authors caution the reader that they have not made an independent evaluation of the ap-
parent problems cited in the text because no such evaluation fell within the scope of this
research. It is important, however, that such groundwork be done. In the meantime, assum-
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II introduces in a general way the types of responses which govern-
ment may undertake to address these concerns. Section III consti-
tutes a detailed legal examination of the responses outlined in Sec-
tion II. The conclusion provides a closing comment concerning
what actions might be undertaken.
A. An Overview of Lot Sale Subdivisions in the Charlotte
Harbor Area
Between the late 1950's and early 1970's, almost 900,000 subdi-
vided lots were platted in Charlotte, Lee, and Sarasota counties.
This "platting" was the formal procedure taken by the original
landowners to officially record maps of their subdivisions. Record-
ing of the plats consisted of filing the appropriate surveyed maps
with the county involved and showing that all the existing require-
ments had been fulfilled. Approval of the plats simply consisted of
a county commission confirming that the plat requirements had
been fulfilled, and usually included an agreement to accept dedica-
tion to the public of any roads and canals once they were con-
structed according to county standards. The filing of a plat was
also necessary before the lots could be legally and effectively mar-
keted. Once the plat was accepted, land development activity be-
gan. The creation of these subdivisions constituted a significant
physical undertaking because many areas within the subdivisions
were wetlands which required excavating canals to both drain the
land and provide the necessary fill.
A substantial majority of these lots are contained in only five
vast subdivisions. Together, these five subdivisions cover approxi-
mately 277 square miles, an area of land four times the size of the
City of Miami. The City of Cape Coral is the only incorporated
subdivision. The other four lie within the unincorporated jurisdic-
tion of the three counties. (See Figure 1 and Table 1 for details.)
While Florida readers may be familiar with the scale of develop-
ment involved in these large lot sale subdivisions, readers from
other parts of the country may require a leap of imagination to
understand the size of the land area affected. An overflight of the
subdivisions produces an astonishing vista of treeless blocks of
land stretching to the horizon, marked off by hundreds of miles of
roads, often without a house in sight. (See Figure 2.)
ing these concerns to be legitimate for part or all of the platted lands area, the authors have
focused on identifying and evaluating potential responses, based on research in the planning
and legal literature, meetings and interviews, and the personal experience of the authors.
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FIGURE 1: Detail of Three County Area
PLATTED LANDS
TABLE 1
Inventory of Plats with 100 or More Lots in the Three County
Area*
Approx.
County Subdivision Lots Acres Sq. Miles
Charlotte Port Charlotte 121,024 33,339 52.1
Rotunda 32,791 10,117 15.8
Punta Gorda Isles 18,555 4,906 7.7
Harbor Heights 11,256 1,550 2.4
(all others) 80,89 20,693 32.3
Sub-total 264,465 70,606 110.3
Lee Cape Coral 287,869** 36,778 57.4
Lehigh Acres 132,512 47,338 74.0
(all others) 60,077 14,358 22.4
Sub-total 480,458 98,474 153.8
Sarasota North Port 55,428 44,669 69.8
South Venice 19,587 2,247 3.5
(all others) 65,540 23,279 36.3
Sub-total 140,555 70,195 109.6
TOTAL 885,478 239,275 373.7
* There are a total of 44,866 lots covering 39,888 acres on plats
composed of 100 or less lots.
**Deed restrictions in Cape Coral require two lots to make one
homesite. Also, 3,768 lots are considered "non-developable."
NOTE: The information in this table has been provided by the
Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council.
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FIGURE 2: Aerial Photo of Platted Lands
PLATTED LANDS
While the extraordinary amount of subdivided yet undeveloped
land appears to constitute a needless waste, it represents an inven-
tory available for future population needs and reflects a recent ex-
ample of what has been an historic process of real estate develop-
ment in the United States.
With few exceptions, the cities of America are gigantic grid subdi-
visions. They reveal streets laid out by surveyors in advance of
intense settlement. More often than not, these are streets deline-
ated so that a large landowner or group of landowners could sell
subdivided land with a minimum of effort at maximum prices.
They are subdivisions of terrain which ignore the picturesque,
which ignore the character and quality of the land. They are sub-
divisions intended to foster profit from the land itself 3
The lots in these subdivisions were marketed for single-family
residential development throughout the three county area in ag-
gressive promotional campaigns, and have now been sold to
thousands of owners scattered throughout the United States and
abroad. Many of these owners have apparently purchased their lots
for investment and not for personal use since, after many years,
fewer than 50,000 of the subdivided lots (approximately five per-
cent) have homes on them. Yet the potential population of the
platted lands exceeds the projected total population of the three
county area well into the next century, implying that a significant
number of lots may never be built upon at all.
Many of the subdivisions fail to meet contemporary standards
for development design and natural resources management. The
planning, by today's standards, was poor. Some were not planned
for complete basic services, and lot purchasers were often promised
only roads and a canal system. Furthermore, the platting and sale
of the lots were not phased to coincide with any expected rate of
occupancy. Instead, virtually all of the lots were marketed as fast
as the companies could plat them. It also appears that the develop-
ers of the large subdivisions failed to undertake studies to deter-
mine whether the hydrological systems in the areas were adequate.
In sum, the absence of sophisticated public regulation, which itself
reflected a general lack of public awareness, allowed developers to
proceed with subdivisions which were designed to produce lot
sales, as opposed to viable long-run communities. Although many
of the developers later began to respond to the need for commu-
3. P. WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA 209 (1981).
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nity stability, these early actions have made the task a difficult one
to accomplish.
As population pressure on the Charlotte Harbor area increases
and building on the subdivided lots intensifies, these large subdivi-
sions appear to present three major concerns for state and local
government authorities, planners, and present and future residents
of the area-both for the lots in their current state and if built out.
These concerns are: the provision of basic public services; the pro-
tection of the physical environment; and the quality of community
life.4 The remainder of this section outlines these concerns.
B. Platted Lands Issues
1. Issues Associated with Maintenance of the Subdivisions in
their Current State
SCALE. The lot sale subdivisions are so vast that they pose a
problem of environmental impact from size alone. Large tracts of
land have been so altered that they contribute little to the natural
environment and economic growth of the region, other than by
generating tax revenue to local governments.
LAND USE FLEXIBILITY. Single-family lots comprise the bulk of
the subdivided lands. The subdivisions were designed, developed,
and marketed primarily as leisure-oriented retirement communi-
ties. The premature commitment of this land to detached single-
family housing prevents developers from responding to market de-
mand for different types of dwelling units as the area grows. One
possible result is that developers will turn to other tracts of land to
meet the new market demands, causing much of the subdivided
lands to remain undeveloped. The platted lands are overcommitted
to a particular form of development in a format which precludes
other types of land uses. A paradox thus exists. Development
which is not single-family residential, such as multi-family, com-
4. During one of the meetings held while this article was being prepared, the attendees
were asked: "What is the platted lands problem?" Richard Smith of Sarasota County pro-
vided a comment which summarizes the response of many to that question: "The problem is
the premature commitment of land to residential use in locations, lay-outs and densities
which are fiscally and environmentally unsound to an extent that will unnecessarily degrade
the quality of life in Southwest Florida."
Also, Richard Hamann of the University of Florida Center for Government Responsibility
summarized his views by saying that: "The most tragic thing . ., about the current situa-
tion is that so much land has been ruined, but is not being used except as a commodity for
speculative exchange." Letter from Richard Hamann to Frank Schnidman (August 18,
1982).
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mercial, or industrial, might take place on the platted lands if they
were not in subdivided lots. Instead, developers turn to undevel-
oped land outside the subdivisions. Also, a number of innovative
large single-family residential developments are now targeted for
areas outside the platted lands where more flexible design can oc-
cur. In short, it appears that the inflexibility of the land plan for
the platted lands may be inducing development to take place in
areas of the counties which might otherwise remain untouched.
ESTUARINE DEGRADATION. The canals which facilitated creation
of the subdivided lands (together with agricultural canals) have al-
tered the estuarine fresh and salt water mix in Charlotte Harbor.
The rapid water transportation created by the canals has resulted
in fluctuations in salinity which, in the context of several species of
marine life, is a condition with potentially adverse impacts on im-
portant Charlotte Harbor fisheries.
WATER QUALITY. The road and canal systems of the subdivisions
enhance stormwater runoff, which may contaminate receiving wa-
ters with pollutants formerly "filtered" through vegetation and
soil.
WATER SUPPLY. The canal systems have affected not only the
fresh and salt water mix in Charlotte Harbor, but may also ad-
versely affect future water supplies since rainfall formerly retained
to recharge aquifers (underground water tables) is now drained
into the Harbor. Aquifer recharge, however, is not as critical an
issue in the Charlotte Harbor area as it is elsewhere in the state,
apparently because much of the local water is drawn from the
Floridian Aquifer, which is recharged in central Florida. Also, the
headwaters of available surface water resources are in central
Florida.
2. Issues Associated with the Build-out of the Subdivisions
A substantial population increase is expected in the Charlotte
Harbor area. By the end of this decade, the three counties antici-
pate a thirty-six percent increase in population. Realizing that this
growth will occur, local officials and present residents of the area
fear that these platted lots will be built out in a manner which will
strain fiscal and environmental resources, consequently resulting in
a lower quality of life.
Public and private sector planners feel that a great amount of
conventional individual single-family residential construction will
still gravitate towards the large, outdated yet cheaper subdivisions
which, unlike new subdivisions, predate and thus need not meet
1983]
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Florida's recently enacted extensive development review and per-
mitting processes.
GROWTH CAPACITY. It will become difficult for local governments
to make services available as home building increases. The unpat-
terned "leap-frog" type of development that is expected makes it
expensive to provide adequate public facilities and services to new
residents. In this respect, future service expenditures have been la-
beled a "time bomb." For example, the current population of Cape
Coral is 42,000 and the capacity of the subdivided lots is 350,000 to
400,000. Cape Coral presently has one waste-water facility, and it
is anticipated that three more would be needed to accommodate
full development. Police substations, fire houses, schools, libraries,
playgrounds, etc., will also have to be provided.
At the same time, if existing roads and canals are not main-
tained, they will deteriorate to the point of needing complete re-
placement or restoration. It appears therefore that local govern-
ments are in a situation of either maintaining existing roads and
canals long before they are useful, or allowing them to deteriorate
and having to rebuild them later. Also, many of these roads and
canals were poorly designed and, even if maintained, would still
require substantial expenditures to upgrade them to meet contem-
porary needs and safety standards.
HURRICANE EVACUATION. The ability to move residents to safe ar-
eas before a hurricane strikes is an important planning considera-
tion. Because the major subdivisions are so large, but have so few
arterial streets, their existing road network may prove inadequate
to move a large population on short notice.
WATER QUALITY. As homes are built on the subdivided lots, the
increased number of septic systems may create a water pollution
hazard. Apparently, the soil in some of the subdivisions cannot ac-
cept septic systems. Therefore, unless the developer, the owners, or
the local governments provide the needed sewers, building permits
may be denied. An additional water quality problem may occur be-
cause local governments cannot insure that those septic systems
which are actually permitted will be properly installed and
maintained.
Another by-product of residential development which can ad-
versely affect water quality is the construction of seawalls. This
practice, which has apparently been encouraged in some communi-
ties, increases the erosion process and ultimately results in sedi-
ment pollution of local waters.
WATER SUPPLY. If the build-out of the subdivisions increases, the
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public water systems and the local governments in the Charlotte
Harbor area will be faced with the increasingly difficult task of
meeting rising demands for fresh water with limited water re-
sources. Additional expenditures may help resolve the problem.
For example, as increases in population require drilling into deeper
aquifers of lower water quality, the water can still be purified
through sophisticated water purification systems. As water quality
decreases, however, it becomes increasingly expensive to provide
an adequate supply of water and the rising cost may make home
ownership prohibitively expensive for some lot owners.
The problem for local government, however, will be timing and
revenue sources. As the population increases, expenditures for in-
creased water supply capacity may have to be made before the tax
base is in place to support the cost of such expenditures. This
same situation applies for most of the public facilities and services
which will be needed by the increasing population.
C. Action to Date
The problems outlined above are the result of land use decisions
made to foster sales of land as a commodity, largely to non-resi-
dents. Local governments which were not then equipped to ade-
quately review and regulate the subdivisions gave the initial ap-
proval without realizing the cumulative impact of what they were
doing. What has begun to occur is an awareness on the part of
Florida public officials that the platted lands, whether built out or
undeveloped, pose problems which must be addressed.
The federal government, the State of Florida, the Southwest
Florida Regional Planning Council (SWFRPC), Charlotte County,
Lee County, Sarasota County, and selected local governments have
been examining the problems associated with these subdivisions.
Now that the rate of building is increasing, there is additional
pressure to decide on a course of action before inaction forecloses
any important options. A number of individuals, however, perceive
the platted lands as a substantial local tax resource which con-
sumes an insignificant share of service costs, making continued in-
action attractive in the short term.
In 1975, in response to a nomination by a confederation of envi-
ronmental interests desiring Area of Critical State Concern
(ACSC) status for the Charlotte Harbor area, a Charlotte Harbor
study committee was formed. If such an ACSC designation were
made, it would allow the state to review and approve land use and
related decisions made by local governments within the designated
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boundaries, according to a framework of state criteria.
Following the ACSC nomination to the Division of State Plan-
ning, the state undertook a study of the Charlotte Harbor area and
several meetings were held among state and regional agencies. The
result was a decision in 1977 by the state to develop solutions for
land use and water-related problems in the area, but not to desig-
nate the Charlotte Harbor area as an Area of Critical State
Concern. 5
A second Charlotte Harbor committee was established in 1979 to
again examine Charlotte Harbor issues. Thirty-nine members rep-
resenting state, regional, and local governments, as well as various
local interest groups, were appointed to the committee by the Gov-
ernor. On December 11, 1981, this Charlotte Harbor Resources
Planning and Management Committee held its final meeting and
approved final recommendations.' One of those recommendations
was that the ACSC designation be used solely for those local gov-
ernments that fail to adopt committee recommendations for the
protection of Charlotte Harbor by July, 1982. Since that time, all
5. At that time, the First District Court of Appeals, in Cross Key Waterways v. Askew,
351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), had placed the constitutionality of the enabling legisla-
tion in doubt by ruling that the critical areas section of the Florida Land and Water Man-
agement Act, FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(a)(b) (1975), was an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative authority to the executive branch of state government. 351 So. 2d at 1063. After
affirmance by the Florida Supreme Court, Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 372 So. 2d 913
(Fla. 1978), that section of Chapter 380 was amended to conform with the court's guidelines
for constitutionality.
6. The immediate priorities of the committee's recommendations include floodplain,
stormwater runoff, drainage, and wastewater regulations, and wetlands/barrier island pro-
tection. The committee recognized that as population growth continued, the platted lands
would be built out. Its Management Plan, adopted June 5, 1981, had as Objective No. 10
that "[fluture []and development decisions by local government should be in accord with
the goals and objectives of the Charlotte Harbor [clommittee, and existing platted areas
should also be encouraged to develop in accord with these goals and objectives." Under the
discussion of suggested implementation actions to achieve this goal were:
a) Local Government: Require [that] all development coincide with the ability
of public and private sectors to provide community services and facilities as based
on studies employing methods of reasonable predictability generally acceptable in
the planning profession.
b) Local Government/All [Algencies: [E]ncourage land use changes for platted
but undeveloped areas to protect those environmentally sensitive and to assist in
the provision of governmental services, to discourage urban sprawl and to protect
agricultural lands.
c) Local Government/DOT: Highway corridor planning for undeveloped areas
shall consider suitability of adjacent land for urbanization and directing construc-
tion away from environmentally sensitive areas.
d) Legislature: [E]xplore ways to encourage voluntary reassembly by develop-
ment of platted and sold subdivisions where environmental or other public bene-
fits could result from a redesign of such subdivisions.
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jurisdictions have complied with the recommendations and there
have been no ACSC designations.
Recommendations for local government action resulting from the
committee study include both planning and regulation aimed at
improving the quality of stormwater and wastewater that enter the
estuary of Charlotte Harbor, promoting coordinated development
on the mainland, and discouraging further development on barrier
islands and other high-hazard flood zones. The comprehensive
planning effort following up on these recommendations remains to
be done.
D. Problem Definition and Establishment of Goals-The Need
for a Plan for the Platted Lands
The foregoing statement of issues and concerns needs to have
substantial scientific research undertaken to examine the real ex-
tent of the problem, though much useful work has already been
done. Once that effort is complete, appropriate responses can be
more clearly defined.
For example, once the current status on numbers of lots and
their ownership pattern is determined and mapped, some careful
estimates will need to be made of the build-out rate and location of
anticipated future development. When both the current situation
and projected future of the platted lands are determined, it will
then be feasible to begin to determine what conditions will require
a government response if a different future is desired. For example,
it may appear that the anticipated level of growth is not desirable,
or that the location should be altered, or that physical environ-
mental considerations require other changes to be made. The goals
and objectives should be clarified and incorporated in a carefully
drawn plan for the platted lands.
The importance of credible information and a comprehensive
planning process serving as a basis for governmental response can-
not be overstated. While past decisions of Florida courts are useful
in gauging government response to new initiative, the decisions are
not conclusive because the scope of the platted lands situation is
unique and new to the courts. Consequently, a court reviewing a
challenge to a program to address platted lands problems needs to
be persuaded that the public initiative is appropriate to the cir-
cumstances. As will be discussed below, there are a range of re-
sponses worthy of consideration, though the specific choice for an
area is likely to vary depending upon the results of the planning
inquiry. It is to an overview of these responses and the legal con-
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text in which they are found that this article will now turn, fol-
lowed by a more detailed discussion of how they are likely to be
treated as a matter of Florida and federal law.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RESPONSES TO PLATTED LANDS
PROBLEMS ONCE THE GOAL DEFINITION AND PLANNING EFFORT
HAVE BEEN COMPLETED
A. Introduction
The platted lands issue evolved because of a number of individ-
ual decisions which collectively resulted in a scale of subdivision
beyond any expectation. It may be that a comprehensive set of re-
sponses is now required. In short, if the problems are found to be
substantial, they may require a substantial remedy. It may prove,
however, that the identified problems of the platted lands can be
divided into discrete and isolated subsidiary problems which can
be addressed independently.
Until the planning is done, the choice of responses will be uncer-
tain. But it is possible, in light of the foregoing information, to
select a variety of actions and discuss them in the legal context in
which they are found. The responses which follow are roughly or-
dered in ascending degree of government intervention and public
cost.
For example, it might prove relatively simple to require a permit
before further development may take place on a portion of the
platted lands which have a specific environmental problem, with
the requirement that the problem be remedied before building
could take place. At the other end of the spectrum, it may prove
necessary for some of the terrain alterations that produced the
platted lands in the first place to be reversed and the land restored
to something close to its pre-existing natural condition. That kind
of intervention obviously involves not only legislative action, but a
change in the landscape as well.
Each of these options for public response is discussed below, fol-
lowed by an overview of key legal issues.
B. An Outline of the Range of Potential Responses to
Identified Platted Lands Problems
As indicated above, public responses will grow out of the plan-
ning process for the platted lands and the information base upon
which the plan is constructed. While the specific choice of re-
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sponses to identified problems for specific areas of the platted
lands will probably vary, the following have been selected as wor-
thy of consideration. These responses are outlined at this point
and are explored in greater detail after this summary review.
1. Continuing to Do What is Already Being Done
The platted lands are already subject to a variety of land use
controls and regulations either at the local or state level. It might
be feasible in some areas of the platted lands to leave these regula-
tions virtually untouched and allow development to continue in
the current regulatory environment. If the planning process for the
platted lands indicates that many of the platted lots should not be
built out as platted or not built out at all, however, then new re-
sponses will be needed.
2. Limiting or Restricting the Use of Existing Platted Lands
in Specific Areas for Specific Reasons
It may appear that certain areas of the platted lands should be
developed only if specific conditions can be met, conditions that
are not now considered under existing law. For example, a detailed
study may show that if all lots in a specific area were built with
septic systems, an adverse impact on underlying groundwater
would occur. Thus, while homes with septic systems could be built
on a few lots, full development of a specific area could overload the
carrying capacity of the soil. In such a situation, either the number
of units to be developed would have to be reduced to meet that
carrying capacity, or development would have to be restricted un-
less a sewer or some alternative adequate on-site sewage disposal
system could be installed. In another situation, it may prove im-
portant to temporarily delay the build-out process while the un-
derlying planning is being completed. In other words, to avoid
making irreparable mistakes, the area may need to be put on
"hold" by use of a moratorium.
Finally, there may be specific areas that, upon examination,
should not be built out at all, either because of the impact on criti-
cal environmental resources or because public facilities are not
available to sustain a large population. Rather than have a smaller
population scattered throughout the area, it may be best to have a
large population concentrated in a specific area, leaving other areas
completely undeveloped.
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3. Timing, Locating and Paying for the Development of Plat-
ted Lands
It may prove that the plan for the platted lands will not neces-
sarily require restricting the use of the lands or conditioning their
use, but instead may require that development proceed in accor-
dance with the orderly provision of public services such as sewer,
water, roads, and schools. Numerous devices exist to phase devel-
opment in this way, ranging from direct regulation to charging spe-
cial fees for services to outlying areas.
4. Reassembly of Platted Lands
It may turn out that some platted lands will need to be recom-
bined where existing lot lines themselves block alternative and
more sensible uses of the land. It is therefore important to know
the extent to which government can mandate or at least induce the
recombination of some of the existing platted properties so that
they can be redeveloped in an alternative configuration. If recom-
bination can occur, the rights of the landowners who are subject to
that recombination will become a critical legal issue.
5. Restoring Some Areas in Whole or in Part to a Natural
Condition
In addition to precluding development, the restoration of certain
portions of the platted lands may be required. Some of the legal
implications of the restoration option are explored in Section III.
6. Government/Developer Negotiation
Some of the planning objectives may encounter legal obstacles
which will either be insurmountable, or at least sufficiently serious
to merit governmental consideration of the alternative of at-
tempted negotiation with those land developers who still remain
involved with their subdivisions. Financial inducements to lot-
swap and concentrate land development in specific areas are
among the possible actions.
C. The Legal Context for the Public Response Options
Each of these options, and a range of intermediate ones, involves
a variety of legal devices with a variety of legal implications. At the
outset, however, it is important that the detailed discussion that
follows does not obscure certain general principles.
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First, as discussed earlier, the responses need to be appropriate
to the problems. Not only does it make sense to avoid doing more
than is necessary, but it is also more likely for a court reviewing a
challenged local government initiative to sustain the initiative if
the court is persuaded not only that the action taken lies within a
range of reasonable responses, but that it is difficult to respond to
a particular circumstance in virtually any other way. In short, this
is an application of the principle that a governmental or public re-
sponse is likely to succeed as a matter of law when it is based upon
sound policy and is appropriate and responsive to the problems.
A second general consideration is a sense of fairness. What gov-
ernment undertakes must, for political reasons as well as those of
legal sufficiency, be as fair as possible under the circumstances.
That concept, however, is defined by the facts of each specific case,
whether it involves a lot purchaser or platted land developer, and
is classified under a variety of similar doctrines-estoppel, vested
rights, and "taking" of private property without just compensation.
Finally, it is important to outline some threshold issues of gov-
ernmental power in the platted lands context.
1. The Power of Government Over Land Use
The power of government obviously includes the use of persua-
sion and inducement, but this power is grounded in the other pow-
ers of government to command, tax, and spend.
THE POLICE POWER. The power to command, otherwise known as
the police power, is an inherent attribute of government. In the
area of land use, an owner's right to use his land is not unlimited,
but is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. He may not,
for example, use his land to cause a nuisance to his neighbor or to
the public at large. Governments have also limited otherwise lawful
activity in order to confer collective benefits, such as basic residen-
tial zoning that not only restricts a lot in an area to residential use
but also benefits it by preventing nonresidential development on
adjacent lots. Private actions can be limited in order to protect key
parts of the landscape, such as landmarks, and governments can
also limit the use of land where there is an apparent need to pro-
tect the public from some harm.
In the platted lands the prevention of pollution, protection of
fisheries, protection of water supplies, and prevention of loss of life
in hurricanes are all valid public concerns, and the more serious
they prove to be, the more regulatory responses will be justified. In
that regard, recent developments in land use and environmental
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law allow increasing restriction on private property in the face of
information about the adverse impacts of a proposed use of the
property on natural environmental systems and orderly growth. As
Mr. Justice Sutherland said in the 1926 Supreme Court decision
upholding zoning, "the meaning of constitutional guaranties never
varies, [however,] the scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are con-
stantly coming within the field of their operation."17 The scope of
the police power has expanded to take account of new situations
and conditions.' As the expansion progresses, the courts will still
limit the application of otherwise lawful regulation when it is per-
ceived to impose an unfair burden on the owners of specific
properties-the fairness concept discussed previously.
In the platted lands context, factors such as the ultimate defini-
tion of problems, the size of the land area and number of lots af-
fected, and the lack of a vigorous resale market for lot purchasers
who are faced with competition from thousands of others similarly
situated as well as from the original developer, may alter the legal
rules that might otherwise apply in more conventional situations.
In short, readers should be aware that the law adjusts to meet new
situations, and traditional doctrines which have been established
in contexts involving one or two parcels may prove to be inade-
quate when stretched to cover several hundred square miles and
several hundred thousand owners.
THE POWER TO TAX. In general, governments raise revenue from
exactions on consumption (user charges, sales taxes, benefit assess-
ments), taxes on wealth (property and estate taxes) and taxes on
income. The land-related revenue devices which are of most inter-
est are the real property tax, the special assessment for certain
capital and maintenance expenses, and the "impact fee" on new
development.
THE POWER TO SPEND. In general, public funds may be expended
only for public purposes. But government can often schedule and
allocate its spending decisions, such as road building and sewer
construction, to affect the process of land development. More than
that, government has the power of eminent domain to compel a
landowner to sell land he owns. This power may be exercised to
7. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
8. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). "The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
where ... the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for peo-
ple." Id. at 9.
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"take" land for "public use" upon payment of "just compensation"
to the landowner.
2. The Level of Government
Under Florida law these governmental powers are not granted to
all levels of government in the same degree. Consequently, the
choice of the level of government to undertake a response will af-
fect the range of potential alternatives.
In Florida, the platted lands are largely a matter of county juris-
diction, with one large subdivision (Cape Coral) constituting a sep-
arate municipality. Under Florida law, "charter" counties can exer-
cise greater authority than non-charter authorities. Florida
constitutional provisions relating to these questions are discussed
later, but it is sufficient at this point to note that while local gov-
ernments have broad powers, the state plays a direct role in many
aspects of land use.
3. Lots in Unitary Ownership versus Lots in Scattered
Ownership
In considering any action, an important point to remember is
that the platted lands have many owners. Some areas may have
many lots owned by one company or individual that are contiguous
to each other-lots in unitary ownership. Other areas may have
lots owned by many people-lots in scattered ownership. The
choice of responses for a specific area of the platted lands will be
affected by the ownership pattern involved.
A parcel in unitary ownership, even though platted, may still
present a clean slate for many land use controls and incentives.
For example, it may be feasible to deplat it or to rezone it, as dis-
cussed in more detail in Section III. But what may be possible for
one owner becomes difficult for many:
If past experience is any guide, many of the lots now being cre-
ated will never be used at all: in this case, it is, "lots first, build-
ings never." The lot lines will remain on the record books,
though, and land titles will become ever more clouded as decades
pass. Tough for the land buyers? Yes. Tough also for the environ-
ment, as is shown by any number of "dead subdivisions" created
forty or fifty years ago. If a few scattered lots are built upon, the
subdivision may become a sparsely settled rural slum.
Once the countryside has been given over to quarter-acre or 1-
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acre lots ... you can forget thoughts of clustering, variable den-
sities, common open spaces, and the like .... [T]he lot lines will
survive to block sensitive use of the land.'
In recognition of the different responses needed depending upon
ownership patterns, this article focuses most heavily on what can
be done when lots are in scattered ownership.
4. Lots Under Contract for Deed
A substantial number of lots in the platted lands subdivisions
have been sold under contracts for deed, that is, legal title to the
land is in the developer or his successors in interest and will be
conveyed to the purchaser upon payment of the final installment
of the purchase price.
The SWFRPC staff has made a preliminary estimate that title to
approximately fifteen percent of the platted lands now remains in
the developer, including an uncertain percentage under contract
for deed. 10 Some of these contracts for deed are likely to be out-
standing when and if additional governmental responses are under-
taken. A key issue, therefore, is whether such lots are to be treated
as the developer's-in unitary ownership-or the purchaser's-in
scattered ownership-in determining the appropriate governmen-
tal response. The conventional rule, adopted in Florida, treats the
purchaser as the "equitable" owner even though title stays in the
developer, meaning that the purchaser bears the risk of loss during
the contract payment period. For a variety of reasons, this rule
may require an exception when applied to a problem as large in
scope as the platted lands. But for purposes of this discussion, the
reader should assume that references below to lots in scattered
ownership refer to lots under contract for deed as well as lots al-
ready owned outright by purchasers, with a strong caveat that the
applicable law could ultimately coincide with the administrative
simplicity of treating the developer as "owning" all lots to which
he still holds legal title.1"
9. THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 275-76 (W. Reilly ed.
1973).
10. The SWFRPC has attempted to ascertain how many of the platted lots have not
been marketed and are still owned by developers. Using plats of 100 lots or more which were
registered with the Division of Lots Sales and Condominiums as a guide, it was estimated
that 15.97% of the platted lots in the three county area are in company ownership. This
figure includes lots which have been retained by the companies in contract for deed arrange-
ments with lot purchasers.
11. If a governmental response to the platted lands affects a lot's availability for devel-
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III. A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PUBLIC RESPONSES
A. Continuing to Do What is Already Being Done
The existing platted lands could be left alone, relying on the
opment, will that impact fall on the seller-developer or on the purchaser? More specifically,
will the purchaser now be able to unwind his purchase or will he be compelled to continue
payment on a lot that may have no value to him? This is one of those areas where the law as
it has emerged over time may need to be rethought when applied to a situation as extensive
as these platted lands.
A frequently debated question concerns the rights and liabilities of the parties to a con-
tract for deed during the period between execution of the contract and conveyance of legal
title when an event causes a loss of the property or otherwise diminishes its value. If the
parties allocate the risk of loss between themselves in the contract, then such a provision
will ordinarily be controlling. In the absence of such a contract provision, however, the court
must determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, employing equitable principles. Al-
though courts agree that the "owner" should bear the loss, there is disagreement as to which
party is the "owner" for this purpose. Three differing views on the outcome of this problem
have received varying degrees of acceptance in American courts. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 11.30, at 90 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
The most widely accepted resolution is that the purchaser becomes the "equitable owner"
from the time the vendor-purchaser relationship arises (i.e., the execution of the contract),
and thus the purchaser bears the risk of loss regardless of who is in actual possession of the
property at the time of the loss. Id. This is the so-called "equitable conversion theory."
Two minority views have received some support in the courts. Several courts have held
that the burden of loss should remain on the vendor until the conveyance of legal title, even
though the vendee may be in possession. Id. at 91. This view disregards the doctrine of
equitable conversion and is based on the common law theories of consideration and implied
conditions. A second minority position, expressed in the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser
Risk Act, is that the party in possession should bear the risk of any loss occurring between
the time of execution of the contract and conveyance of legal title. UNIF. VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER RISK ACT § l(b), 14 U.L.A. 554 (1980).
The doctrine of equitable conversion has been generally adopted in Florida. Arko Enters.,
Inc. v. Wood, 185 So. 2d 734, 736-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). See generally 33 FLA. JUR. Vendor
and Purchaser § 101, at 461 (1960 & Supp. 1982). The theory has been applied to an execu-
tory contract for the sale of land. J.C. Penney Co. v. Koff, 345 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA
1977). Therefore, the purchasers of lots in the platted subdivisions under contracts for deed
are likely to be deemed the equitable owners of the land and would bear the burden of any
loss or benefit to the land absent any contractual provision allocating such risks in a differ-
ent manner. For example, if a loss due to flooding were to occur, the purchaser would still be
obligated to pay the purchase price agreed upon in the contract, rather than have the seller
bear any such burden.
The same general rule is true for eminent domain. In the situation where land subject to
an executory contract for deed is taken by a governmental authority by way of eminent
domain between the time of execution of the contract and conveyance of legal title, a major-
ity of courts apply the doctrine of equitable conversion and hold that, in the absence of a
controlling contractual provision, the purchaser must pay the purchase price and is entitled
to the condemnation award. Annot., 27 A.L.R. 3d 572, 592, 612 (1969 & Supp. 1981). A
minority of jurisdictions (11) have adopted the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act,
which allocates the entire risk of loss due to eminent domain proceedings to the party in
possession, absent any contractual provision. UmF. VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK AcT § 1, 14
U.L.A. 554 (1980).
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market to induce development in the more desirable areas. The
The courts of Florida follow the majority view and place the burden of any loss due to an
exercise of eminent domain on the purchaser. See, e.g., Arko Enters., Inc., 185 So. 2d at 740
(court applied doctrine of equitable conversion and held that condemnation of real property
after execution of contract and before conveyance of legal title is not a ground for recision
and buyer is entitled to condemnation award).
This doctrine could also be applied to a loss due to a zoning change in the period between
execution of the contract and conveyance of title as well as to the usual case of casualty loss.
This is apparently the general rule. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1361 (1962). In a case of first
impression in 1969, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after noting that the doctrine of equi-
table conversion was well established in Pennsylvania law, found that no reasonable argu-
ment could be made for not applying the doctrine to determine who should bear the risk of
loss due to a zoning change. DiDonato v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 249 A.2d 327, 329,
330 (Pa. 1969).
The courts of Florida ordinarily hold that the beneficial owner is the party who must bear
the consequences of any governmental action, absent a contractual provision on the subject.
E.g., J.C. Penney Co., 345 So. 2d at 736. In J.C. Penney Co., the court held that the benefi-
cial owner (i.e., the purchaser, after applying equitable conversion upon execution of the
contract) is the party directly affected by the change in zoning. Id. Thus, the purchaser
would reap the benefit of any enhancement in the value of the land as a result of the rezon-
ing as well as bear any loss that may attend a zoning change, even though title may still be
in the developer. Florida courts would most likely adhere to this position in a case involving
a platted lot purchased under a contract for deed.
However, any new governmental response is likely to involve not one but many lots.
Moreover, the platted lot is not the same as the conventional single-family home. It is one of
thousands of virtually identical parcels marketed in mass. These two facts could lead the
courts to a different ruling for several reasons.
First, if the purchaser were to default on his agreement to buy, it would likely mean he
might be practically judgment-proof except to the extent of the value of his lot because of
his non-resident status or the cost of recovery. In lay terms, the developer may be stuck
anyway.
Second, the platted lands may have little current resale value. The lots may be difficult
for individual owners to sell since the market is largely "manufactured" by developer sales
efforts, and any lot an individual purchaser may wish to sell must compete with lots being
sold from developer inventory. Thus, the developer may be better able to sell a lot than the
purchaser.
Third, as an extension of these relative hardship considerations, the developer may be
better suited to absorb the loss involved. A single purchaser with an unbuildable lot has
little. A developer with many individually unbuildable lots may in fact have one large build-
able parcel.
Finally, the equitable conversion doctrine used to decide who bears the risk of loss treats
the contract as complete even though title has yet to pass. But equitable conversion is
grounded on the assumption that a court would order specific performance of a land sale
agreement by the purchaser even though the property has been injured in some way be-
tween the time the contract for sale has been signed and the time the deed has been deliv-
ered. In some cases, such as the risk of fire loss, it is appropriate to put the burden upon the
party in possession on the theory that the risk of loss should follow the occupancy of the
property. In the case of the platted subdivisions, however, the court could view the pur-
chaser of a subdivided lot as being similar to the purchaser of a specific product where the
risk of loss does not pass to the purchaser until possession has been acquired. To the extent
that the developer retains possession under a contract for deed, he is analogous to a seller of
a commodity, which is an appropriate comparision in light of the character of the subdi-
vided platted lands.
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option of inaction, however, leaves government with the serious
problem of deterioration of existing roads and canals. Further-
more, to the extent that the platted lands continue to be built out
in scattered sites, operating costs for local government services will
increase with the degree of development dispersion. This latter
problem could be ameliorated, however, by the fact that some of
the companies which sold the subdivided lots generally have tried
to implement "lot swapping" arrangements whereby owners who
wish to develop are encouraged to do so in areas where building
has already occurred. The extent to which these arrangements
could alleviate dispersed build-out is something which needs care-
ful study, and could play an important role in negotiated responses
to some of the identified problem areas discussed below.
B. Limiting or Restricting the Use of.Existing Platted Lands
in Specific Areas for Specific Reasons
1. Rezoning to Lower Density
When land has not yet been platted into lots, rezoning to in-
crease the minimum lot size needed to build a dwelling is possible,
as long as the comprehensive land use plan affecting the subdivi-
sion at issue is first reviewed by the governing body 2 and the ra-
tionale for the change is clearly related to the public health, safety,
Moreover, unlike the conventional purchase and sale agreement in which both parties are
in relatively equal bargaining positions, the large subdivided lot sale developer is a mass
merchandiser. The developing rules of warranty of fitness applicable to products is being
extended to new construction, and even used homes, but the warranty has never been ap-
plied to physical conditions on the land. Thus, the rule which might otherwise apply may
not be controlling where thousands of lots are at issue. In that case, a court might find the
impact imposed on the platted lands by land use restrictions, as a matter of consumer pro-
tection, to be a burden absorbed by the developer. The argument that the developer facili-
tated the situation requiring the remedial action in the first place, as between the purchaser
and the developer, could lead a court to find that the risk of loss should be appropriately
allocated to the developer.
In summary, then, a court may choose to vary the conventional Florida rule and place the
risk of any loss resulting from government responses to the platted lands on the land devel-
oper, absent special circumstances applicable to individual lots, on the basic belief that, as
between the developer and the lot purchaser, the developer should more fairly bear the risk
until title has passed. Such an outcome would also facilitate any rational governmental re-
sponse because planners would only need inquire as to those lots to whom title has passed,
and treat all others-both those unsold and those under contract for deed-as developer
owned.
Thus, while past Florida decisions, as well as those of other jurisdictions, argue for treat-
ing purchasers of platted lots under contract for deed as the equitable owners, the platted
lands situation may nonetheless require treating the developer as owner.
12. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1981) (amended 1983).
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or welfare. s
Increasing lot size requirements for the platted lands, however,
poses other difficulties. Owners of individual or contiguous home
sites thereby rendered unbuildable may try to show that they have
acquired a vested right which protects them from a change in the
zoning or that their reliance on governmental action prevents en-
forcement of the new zoning as to their lot. They may also argue
that they have been left with no constitutionally adequate use of
the property, and are therefore entitled to either invalidation of
the regulation or compensation for their property.1 To understand
these issues requires some background in zoning, the principle
technique by which local governments control the use of land, the
size of parcels needed, and the external aspects of structures such
as bulk or parking.
LIMITS OF REZONING POWER. Since the United States Supreme
Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company1 5 in
1926, it has been clear that local government can regulate the use
of land through the exercise of police power. Village of Euclid, rec-
ognized as the leading case on the validity of a zoning ordinance,16
held that the allocation and restriction of land uses through zoning
were consistent with the United States Constitution1 7 and laid to
13. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). For example, the
provision of public services to low density housing may prove more expensive per unit than
services to higher density areas, making a service cost justification for lower density rezoning
difficult to sustain.
14. The question also exists as to whether lot owners could seek relief from rezoning as
to minimum lot size on the basis of an alleged non-conforming use. The platting of land,
however, is not normally considered a "use" in zoning law for the purpose of establishing a
non-conforming use. See R.A. Vachon & Son, Inc. v. City of Concord, 289 A.2d 646, 650
(N.H. 1972) (city zoning amendment governing non-conforming uses does not apply to land-
owner who took no action until after the zoning amendment). Of course, this rule does not
apply in states which have enacted statutes which grant immunity from zoning changes to
subdivisions which have received final approval. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-26a (1981);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West 1979). Apparently, Florida does not have such a
statute. There is a clause in the Florida Statutes which provides for exemption of a project
from the necessity of seeking Development of Regional Impact (DRI) approval if prior ap-
proval had already been secured from local authorities having jurisdiction. FLA. STAT. §
380.06(18) (1981). This statute provides immunity from subsequent DRI regulations only.
Note that the protection afforded landowners from the designation of land as an Area of
Critical State Concern under § 380.05(18), Florida Statutes (1981), is not as sweeping. That
provision merely reaffirms that affected landowners have vested rights and that designation
of land as an Area of Critical State Concern does not extinguish those rights, Id.
15. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
16. E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953), appeal dis-
missed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
17. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395, 397.
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rest the concern that zoning controls were per se an unconstitu-
tional infringement upon property rights.
In Village of Euclid, the Supreme Court set out the test for de-
termining the validity of a zoning ordinance: "If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable,
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 18
This test has been applied in Florida. 1" In applying the fairly
debatable test to a particular zoning ordinance, "the evidence need
not establish the wisdom, propriety or efficacy of the ordinance.
Rather, it is only necessary to show that reasonable men might dif-
fer as to the reasonableness of the ordinance and, upon such a
showing, it must be sustained."20 It is not sufficient, however, to
establish that a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable by demon-
strating that expert witnesses disagree on the reasonableness of an
ordinance. The fairly debatable rule must be applied to the basic
physical facts that exist as to a particular parcel of land.2
Florida courts have at times seemed uncertain as to how the
fairly debatable test should apply. They have attempted to treat
the fairly debatable test as if it were analogous to the test for de-
termining the validity of an action of an administrative
agency-that its decision be rational in light of all the competent
substantial evidence before it.2 2 However, zoning has been deemed
a legislative function, not a quasi-judicial function to which the
competent substantial evidence test would apply. Thus, the two
tests are not similar and should be used for different purposes." In
Dade County v. Yumbo, S.A.,2 4 the court pointed out that it is
clearly wrong to apply the competent substantial evidence test in
cases challenging zoning actions, "which are universally considered
administrative in nature" and that the trial court should instead
apply the fairly debatable test.25
Since the fairly debatable test is heavily weighted in favor of the
18. Id. at 388.
19. Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837, 838 (Fla. 1972); Lachman, 71 So. 2d at
150, 152.
20. Faust, Zoning, in FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PACTICES III § 13.8, at 13.25-.26 (Fla. Bar
CLE Manual, 2d ed. 1976).
21. See Oklahoma City v. Barclay, 359 P.2d 237, 242 (Okla. 1960).
22. See, e.g., Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1975) (applicant for rezoning must prove by competent substantial evidence that ex-
isting ordinance or classification is not fairly debatable).
23. Faust, supra note 20, § 13.18, at 13.25.
24. 348 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
25. Id. at 394.
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zoning authority, Florida appellate courts have been reluctant to
invalidate zoning decisions of local governments.2 6 Thus, an attack
on a zoning ordinance may often fail due to this deference to the
governmental authority provided that the ordinance also has the
requisite relationship to a legitimate goal.27
[T]he right of an urban owner to the free use of his property may
be regulated by a legitimate exercise of the police power, and
when so asserted, fairly and impartially in the interest of the pub-
lic health, safety, morals or general welfare, the courts will not
substitute their judgment for that of the public officials . . . un-
less it clearly appears that their action has no just foundation in
reason and necessity.28
Florida cities were given land use regulatory powers in 1939,29
26. See City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d 442, 444-45 (Fla. 1956) (upholding
zoning ordinance; stating that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of local
government in zoning decisions unless enforcement results in confiscation of property);
Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 152 (upholding denial of rezoning application because existing ordi-
nance fairly debatable). The fairly debatable test is really a question of procedural law: "If
the application of a zoning classification to a specific parcel of property is reasonably subject
to disagreement, that is, if its application is fairly debatable, then the application of the
ordinance by the zoning authority should not be disturbed by the courts." Davis v. Sails,
318 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
27. The United States Supreme Court, in describing the constitutional limits of the
power to zone, held that before a zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, it must
be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. This standard also has
been adopted in Florida. Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406, 410 (Fla. 1940); S.A. Healy Co.
v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The reasonable rela-
tionship test is a matter of substantive law: "The fairly debatable rule. . . does not modify
the requirement that the ordinance itself and the application thereof must have a reasona-
ble relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare." Davis, 318 So. 2d at 217
(emphasis in orginal).
In this view, it has been recognized that regulations which are enacted in order to prevent
or avoid serious traffic congestion are substantially related to the general welfare of the
community. See, e.g., Trachsel v. City of Tamarac, 311 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
(avoidance of traffic congestion is in interest of public welfare; evidence showing that enact-
ment of zoning ordinance was conducive to that end indicates that propriety of zoning ordi-
nance is fairly debatable and should therefore be upheld). Furthermore, the Florida Su-
preme Court has recognized that it is exclusively within the legislative competence to
consider such factors as future growth and development, adequacy of drainage and storm
sewers, public streets, and population density. See City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d
836, 837-38 (Fla. 1969) (final decree of trial court which directed municipality to rezone
certain property reversed because ultimate classification of property involves exercise of leg-
islative powers and consideration of factors peculiarly within legislative competence).
28. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1941).
29. Ch. 19539, 1939 Fla. Laws 1248 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 166.011-.021
(1981)).
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making Florida the last of the existing forty-eight states to author-
ize, by general law, local governmental zoning.30 However, it was
not until 1969 that a similar general law authorizing counties to
exercise land use regulatory powers was adopted.3
Following the 1939 and 1969 zoning enabling acts, which were
permissive, the legislature adopted the Local Government Compre-
hensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA),32 which mandated plan-
ning (as distinct from zoning) by all local governments, including
large counties such as Charlotte, Lee, and Sarasota. The LGCPA
requires zoning to be in conformance with the comprehensive plan
for a particular area.
The LGCPA requires these counties to include ten specific ele-
ments in their plans. Once these elements are addressed in the ap-
plicable plan, zoning changes in conformance with these elements
can be enacted. Since under the LGCPA all development regula-
tions must be in conformance with the plan, which includes build-
ing permits, special permits, etc., the entire framework for address-
ing platted lands issues could be met by the comprehensive plan.33
"GRANDFATHERED RIGHTS" OR VESTED RIGHTS AND ESTOPPEL.
Under certain conditions, an owner of land can acquire a right to
continue to develop his land even though the government changes
the rules to prohibit the type of development undertaken. This
concept is commonly called "grandfathering," but its technical
name is either vested rights or estoppel. The issue here is whether
the existing platted lots are protected by this doctrine from a
change in minimum lot size.
Although the concepts of vested rights and equitable estoppel
arise from distinct theories, the Florida courts are apparently com-
fortable with using the doctrines interchangeably.3 4 It has been
noted that courts may reach the same result in any given factual
situation regardless of which concept is applied.3 5
30. See O'Connell, Whatever Happened to "Zoning" or What You Need to Know About
"The Local Planning Act" But Don't Know What to Ask!, 50 FLA. B.J. 46, 46 (1976).
31. Ch. 69-139, 1969 Fla. Laws 642 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160-.315
(1981)).
32. Ch. 75-257, 1975 Fla. Laws 794 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211
(1981) (amended 1983)).
33. As required by the LGCPA, Charlotte, Lee, and Sarasota counties have adopted
comprehensive plans. These plans, however, may need further work to focus specifically on
the future development issues of the platted lands.
34. Rhodes, Vested Rights Update, 54 FLA. B.J. 787, 787 (1980); see, e.g., Compass Lake
Hills Dev. Corp. v. State, 379 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (appellant did not acquire
vested rights status under exemption from DRI review provision based on estoppel theory).
35. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and
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The general rule in Florida is that equitable estoppel will pre-
clude a municipality from exercising its zoning power where "[a]
property owner (1) in good faith (2) upon some act or omission of
the government (3) has made such a substantial change in position
or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it
would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he ac-
quired.''1 6 As one court explained the application of this rule:
[T]he theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an appli-
cation of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to
invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to
snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced or
permitted to stand thereon. 7
Estoppel will come about only if the change in position is induced
by an official act performed under circumstances which give rise to
a reasonable conclusion that the government knew or should have
known that its act would be relied upon in that very manner.38
Ordinarily, the issuance of a building permit is a sufficient gov-
ernmental act to give rise to vested rights or estoppel5 9 Therefore,
absent special circumstances," owners of lots in the platted lands
who have obtained building permits and have detrimentally relied
thereon should have a vested right to build on their lots regardless
of restrictions imposed by subsequent zoning ordinances.
As a general rule, the existence or absence of zoning restrictions
alone does not constitute a governmental act which, without a
building permit or some other authorization, establishes vested
Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63, 65. See also C. SIEMON & W.
LARSEN, VESTED RIGHTS: PROTECTING DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS BY VESTING RIGHTS pas-
sim (1982) (detailed discussion of concept of vested rights).
36. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976) (quot-
ing City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA
1973)).
37. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
(quoting Driver, J., Cir. Ct., Pinellas County).
38. See, e.g., City of North Miami v. Margulies, 289 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
(city estopped from denying building permit to landowner who incurred substantial expend-
itures in reliance upon prior rezoning and issuance of conditional use permit).
39. See, e.g., City of Hialeah v. Allmand, 207 So. 2d 9, 9-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (per
curiam) (city estopped from prohibiting completion of industrial plant because it had previ-
ously issued building permit to owners thereof).
40. See Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d at 870 (if city can show that "some new
peril to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the municipality has arisen between
the granting of the building permit and the subsequent change of zoning to the detriment of
the landowner, the change of zoning may effectively revoke a building permit").
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rights or estoppel."' Therefore, in the event that the platted lands
subdivisions are rezoned, owners of lots in the platted lands are
not likely to successfully argue that they have acquired vested
rights to build on their lots on the basis of pre-existing or subse-
quent zoning.
What about plat approval itself? Courts and commentators in
other jurisdictions have indicated that plat approval should be
considered a governmental act sufficient to give rise to vested
rights and estoppel,42 and one recent Florida case held that prelim-
inary plat approval, together with substantial developer reliance,
constituted grounds for estoppel.4 Also, the Florida Legislature
has provided that subdivision approval is a governmental act
which can give rise to vested rights when a landowner's property
falls within an area statutorily designated to be an Area of Critical
State Concern 4 or subject to Development of Regional Impact
(DRI) approval.4 ' It would be possible for the courts of Florida, in
light of this recent case and this statutory policy, to adopt a rule
for the platted lands establishing that subdivision approval is a
governmental authorization to proceed with development which
gives rise to vested rights or estoppel. In that event, owners of lots
and developers of the subdivisions could establish vested rights to
proceed with development upon a showing that they have detri-
mentally relied upon governmental approval of the subdivision
lots.
41. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1954)
(where landowner detrimentally altered his position upon chance that no change in zoning
regulations would occur, city not estopped from enforcing new, more restrictive regulations);
Pasco County v. Tampa Dev. Corp., 364 So. 2d 850, 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (county is not
estopped from enforcing new zoning ordinance prohibiting developer from constructing
multi-family units in subdivision because "[tlhe mere existence of a present right to a par-
ticular use of land, whether derived from a less restrictive zoning ordinance or no zoning
ordinance at all, is not a sufficient 'act' of government upon which to base equitable
estoppel").
42. See, e.g., Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Township, 186 A.2d 489, 495, 498 (N.J. 1962)
(city is estopped from rezoning property where city had approved subdivision plans and
developer detrimentally relied thereon); 4 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 50.03(d), at 50-39 to -40 (4th ed. Supp. 1982) (subdivider may secure vested rights in plat
when he changes his position by installing improvements in reliance on grant of final
approval).
43. See Florida Companies v. Orange County, 411 So. 2d 1008, 1009, 1012 (Fla. 5th DCA
1982) (mortgage lender successfully challenged refusal to approve subdivision plat after pre-
liminary plat approved and developer made good faith expenditures for sewage treatment
plant and service lines).
44. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(18) (1981).
45. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(18) (1981).
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However, a large scale development the size of the major platted
subdivisions would, if undertaken today, be subject to the DRI
process, which would address some of the potential problems now
being experienced by the platted lands. Thus, the Florida courts
might decide that, not having borne the burden of the DRI pro-
cess, the platted subdivisions are not entitled to its vesting protec-
tion. A case involving a relatively small subdivision of several hun-
dred lots may prove inapplicable to a situation on the scale of the
platted lands. Moreover, the official government action that pro-
duced most of the platted lands was nominal-the acceptance of a
map. Unlike conventional current subdivision regulation, which in-
volves a review of the proposed land plan,"6 the review process for
much of the original platted lands was pro forma and principally
served as an aid to lot description for ultimate sale. Therefore, the
past approval process may be less likely to create an estoppel situ-
ation than critical public review of a subdivision plan under mod-
ern regulations.
Showing the requisite governmental act is half the issue. The
other half is the landowner's conduct. In establishing detrimental
reliance which, in conjunction with a governmental authorization,
is sufficient to create vested rights or estoppel, it is not necessary
for the landowner in Florida to show that physical changes in the
land have been made.17 Apparently, however, the rule in most ju-
risdictions is that land acquisition costs alone are not a sufficient
detriment to create vested rights8 and there is no direct case law
46. Ch. 71-339, § 3, 1971 Fla. Laws 1533, repealed the provisions in Florida concerning
maps and plats and introduced a new statutory scheme. Among the new requirements is a
provision that the submission of the plat for approval be accompanied by a title opinion
from an attorney at law licensed in Florida or a certification by an abstractor or a title
company indicating that the land described in the plat is owned by the developer. FLA.
STAT. § 177.041 (1981). There is also a more exacting surveying requirement and a mandate
that plats be approved by the appropriate local government before they are recorded. FLA.
STAT. §§ 177.061-.071 (1981).
47. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d at 573 (existence of building permit or physical
changes to land not condition precedent to invoking estoppel); Rhodes, supra note 34, at
790 (has been held that physical changes in property not prerequisite to application of
estoppel).
48. See, e.g., Sautto v. Edenboro Apts., Inc., 174 A.2d 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1961).
Clearly, cost of land to a property owner should not, ordinarily or invariably, be
regarded as a factor of reliance to prevent subsequent zoning upgrading beneficial
to the community at large, since every owner has presumably made an expendi-
ture for his property at some time or other. Cases too numerous to require citation
hold that a property owner may not be exempted from an upgrading zoning ordi-
nance merely because he may more profitably use the property as previously...
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on this issue in Florida.4'9 Assuming that the majority of the owners
of individual lots in the platted lands have not incurred liabilities
beyond the initial acquisition of the land, the adoption of such a
rule in Florida would appear to prevent the creation of vested
rights or estoppel for those lot owners.
Developers of the platted lands who have expended funds for
roads, drainage canals, or made land dedications to the public may
well have undertaken a sufficient detrimental reliance to give rise
to vested rights or estoppel.60 Courts in other jurisdictions have
recognized such expenditures as creating vested rights to develop
in a manner contrary to subsequent zoning restrictions." In other
jurisdictions, however, vested rights do not arise if the developer is
capable of recouping his expenditures despite the increased zoning
restrictions or if he has abandoned the expenditures. 52 One court
has stated that "[t]he right to upgrade zoning requirements in the
public interest may fairly be sustained against a development
which will be subjected to no substantial loss by virtue of the up-
grading. '5 3 Whether Florida courts would so rule is unclear. If so,
then developers who have made expenditures in reliance upon gov-
ernmental approval of subdivision plats" and who have not aban-
zoned.
Id. at 504.
49. In Imperial Homes Corp., the court acknowledged that "the mere purchase of land
does not create a right to rely on existing zoning" but found that land acquisition costs plus
other factors gave rise to an estoppel. 309 So. 2d at 573. In that case, the government re-
zoned the property at the owner's request and was aware that the purchase of the property
was contingent upon the rezoning. Id. The same nexus between a governmental authoriza-
tion and land acquisition costs is not present when the authorization is subdivision ap-
proval. But in Florida Companies, the court found a mortgage lender entitled to standing to
challenge a denial of a plat approval when it had disbursed funds in reliance on preliminary
plat approval. 411 So. 2d at 1009, 1012.
50. See Florida Companies, 411 So. 2d at 1009, 1012 (sewage treatment plant and ser-
vice line expenditure).
51. See, e.g., Telimar Homes, Inc. v. Miller, 218 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961)(mem.) (developer who installed water system, roads, drainage system, and model homes,
acquired vested right against subsequent zoning ordinance which increased lot size
requirements).
52. See Putnam Armonk, Inc. v. Town of Southeast, 382 N.Y.S.2d 538, 541-42 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976) (case remanded for determination of whether developer abandoned or
recouped his expenditures and, in the event that there was partial abandonment or partial
recoupment, whether considerations of public health, safety, and welfare override devel-
oper's remaining interests).
53. Virginia Constr. Corp. v. Fairman, 187 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1962). See also Gisler v.
County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 920, 923 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (18 acre minimum
lot size and agricultural zoning of subdivision recorded with two and one-half acre residen-
tial lots but still used for agricultural purposes upheld).
54. An unresolved issue is whether, in weighing the vesting or estoppel issues, the gov-
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doned those expenditures may have vested rights in the existing
lot sizes if they can prove that they cannot recoup their expendi-
tures with increased lot sizes.
In summary, a rezoning of the platted lands would probably be
effective against a vested rights or estoppel challenge by owners of
individual lots who have not yet obtained building permits under
the old zoning or made substantial expenditures, and against de-
velopers who have not made substantial expenditures and whose
lots provide enough land to permit aggregation to the new mini-
mum lot size without severe hardship.
THE TAKING CHALLENGE TO REZONING. The compensation clause
of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, like sim-
ilar state constitutional provisions, provides that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation. 5 A
rezoning to lower density involves no acquisition or taking by the
government, as when it takes land for a highway, but this constitu-
tional language has been used to invalidate governmental regula-
tion that leaves the property owner in possession but goes "too
far" in regulating its use.56 The standard for finding a taking, in
this regard, has never been established by a definitive test. In each
case, the courts engage in factual ad hoc inquiries in order to de-
termine whether a taking has occurred.5 7
The United States Supreme Court has discussed a number of
factors which bear upon whether a taking has occurred in any
given case. These include (1) the economic impact of the regulation
on the property owner, particularly the extent of interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (2) the character
of the governmental action.5 8 These factors have been cited by the
courts of most states, including Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc.,59 agreed that no definitive formula existed for determining
when an exercise of the police power constituted a taking, but
ernmental act or the landowner reliance is more critical, and also whether any reliance is
always subject to a proviso that government acts vith thereservation that it may change its
mind. For a discussion of this issue in relation to the contract clause of the United States
Constitution, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465-73 (1978).
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
56. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
57. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3171
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
58. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 124.
59. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
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listed six factors which it deemed relevant: (1) whether there is a
physical invasion of the land, (2) whether the regulation precludes
all economically reasonable use, (3) whether the regulation confers
a public benefit or prevents a public harm, (4) whether the regula-
tion promotes the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public,
(5) whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously applied,
and (6) the extent to which the regulation interferes with invest-
ment-backed expectations.6 0 The third, fourth, and fifth factors
cited relate to the validity of the governmental action in the first
place, and the remaining three factors relate to whether a taking
has occurred, either because of the character of the governmental
action or the impact on the property owner.
Thus, an important factor to be considered in evaluating
whether a taking has occurred is whether the zoning regulation is a
valid exercise of the police power.61 In this regard, an increase in
lot size must be shown to be reasonably related to the public
health, safety, and welfare. Alleviation of traffic congestion, 3 pres-
ervation of the environmenta3 and concern for the irreversible ef-
fect on an area's ecological balance as a result of urban develop-
ment 64 have all been recognized as legitimate concerns within the
ambit of the public welfare. Local governments may be able to jus-
tify increases in lot size requirements for the platted lands by
showing that some or all of the above-mentioned ends are the goal
of the rezoning action. 5
60. Id. at 1380-81.
61. Id.
62. See Trachsel v. City of Tamarac, 311 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (avoidance
of traffic congestion is in interests of public welfare and legitimate goal of zoning ordinance).
63. See Town of Indialantic v. McNulty, 400 So. 2d 1227, 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (it is
established that police power may be exercised to protect and preserve environment).
64. Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977).
65. There is a rebuttable presumption that exercises of the police power are reasonably
related to the public health, safety and welfare. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371
So. 2d 154, 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (per curiam). That presumption can be overcome by
substantial competent evidence. Id. In Boca Villas Corp., for example, a zoning amendment
which placed a "cap" on dwelling units was found not to be reasonably related to the public
health, safety and welfare in light of certain findings of fact that (1) utility services would
not be strained by increased growth, (2) water resources could withstand increased growth
so long as proper management policies are maintained, and (3) the city's comprehensive
plan would not be affected if the cap was removed. Id. at 156-57. The court concluded that
the lack of a compelling need justifying the restrictive provision is sufficient to invalidate
the legislative act without considering the question of confiscation. Id. at 157. To the extent
that the local governments in the three county area are able to establish that increased
growth will have deleterious effects on the public health, safety and welfare, and that the
new zoning requirements address those problems, the reasonable relation test will be met.
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But while rezoning may be a valid exercise of the police power,
as applied to a specific parcel, it may nonetheless constitute an in-
valid taking. For example, the character of the governmental ac-
tion is important. A taking is more readily found when a physical
invasion occurs, though physical invasion is not a prerequisite."6
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that if the
intrusion amounts to a permanent physical occupation by the gov-
ernment, its agents, or the general public, the character of the gov-
ernment action is determinative and there is a taking.a7 If the reg-
ulation does not result in a physical invasion, other factors must be
considered in analyzing whether the regulation constitutes a tak-
ing.6s Since the rezoning of the subdivisions under the police power
authority would not result in any physical invasion of the property
by government, its agents, or the public at large, it is the other
factors which relate to the impact on the property owner that
would be determinative. 9
A valid police power regulation may still constitute a taking of
private property for public use without just compensation if the
effect of the regulation is to deny all reasonable use of the prop-
erty7 0 and Florida decisions have held that a zoning ordinance
66. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123 n.25, 124.
67. Loretto, 103 S. Ct. at 3171, 3176; see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 H~Av. L. REV.
1165, 1184 (1967) (physical occupation by government is always a compensable taking).
68. Loretto, 103 S. Ct. at 3177.
69. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have uniformly held that a diminu-
tion in value alone cannot establish a taking. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131; see
Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384, 395 (zoning resulting in 75% diminution in value not a
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 410-11 (1915) (ordinance upheld even
though it caused 87% diminution in value). Furthermore, governmental regulation has been
held permissible even though it prohibits the most beneficial use of the land. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962).
70. Arguably, rezoning ordinarily does not deny all reasonable use of the land. "Prop-
erty," as that word has been construed in the context of taking analysis, signifies the group
of rights held by virtue of ownership of a physical thing. United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). These are the rights to possess, use, and dispose of the
physical thing. Id. at 378; see Loretto, 103 S. Ct. at 3176 (quoting General Motors). Because
rezoning in many circumstances will not substantially interfere with any of these rights it
will be arguable that the property still has value to the owner and that a compensable tak-
ing did not occur. In this regard, the case Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), is of interest.
The United States Supreme Court found that a regulatory prohibition on the sale of arti-
facts partly composed of feathers of statutorily protected birds was not a taking as to trad-
ers of bird artifacts because they retained the rights to possess, transport, devise and donate
their personal property. Id. at 65-66. The mere loss of future profits was insufficient to es-
tablish a taking. Id. at 66.
Related to the economic impact factor is a consideration of whether the regulation inter-
feres to a significant extent with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expec-
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constitutes a taking if the landowner demonstrates that the ordi-
nance effectively deprives him of all reasonable uses of his prop-
tations. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the leading case for that
proposition, the Supreme Court reasoned that an otherwise valid exercise of the police
power may interfere with distinct investment-backed expectations to such an extent that a
taking will occur. 260 U.S. at 414-15. A standard defining such an expectation, however, has
not emerged.
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the Supreme Court considered a
case in which the owners of a pond which was considered to be private property under state
law dredged a channel which connected the pond to navigable waters. 444 U.S. at 166-67.
The Court held that the consent of the Corps of Engineers in the dredging operations led to
a reasonable expectation on the part of the owners that they could exclude people from
their property. Id. at 179. The government could not declare the owners' property to be
navigable waters, and thereby open the property to the general public, without furnishing
just compensation. Id. at 179-80. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co., the Court found that the
plaintiff's primary expectation for the use of its property was as a railroad terminal with
offices and shops. 438 U.S. at 136. Therefore, the plaintiff had not established a taking on
the basis of the city's denial of permission to build a high rise office building in the air space
above the terminal. The Court stated: "[T]he submission that appellants may establish a
'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development, is quite simply
untenable." Id. at 130. Rather, the focus must be on the interference with the rights in the
parcel as a whole. Id. at 130-31.
In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), the factfinder had
concluded that the plaintiff's plans for development did not accomplish the goal of assuring
that the development would not adversely affect the environment. 399 So. 2d at 1383. The
Florida Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff had only "its own subjective
expectation" that the land could be developed without adversely affecting the environment
and that a reasonable investment-backed expectation had not been interfered with when the
plaintiff's application for a DRI permit was denied. Id. The court in Estuary Properties,
Inc. distinguished Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Auth., 171 So. 2d
376 (Fla. 1965) and Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976),
cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977), by pointing out that in both cases the plaintiffs
purchased submerged lands owned by the state with the expectation of filling the land and
the lands were totally useless unless they were filled. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d at
1381, 1383. Furthermore, in Zabel, a statutory right to fill the land existed when the prop-
erty was purchased. Id. at 1383.
In Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the Court of Claims
considered a case in which the plaintiff was prevented from fully developing its land due to
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers and a stiffening of the
requirements for building permits. Id. at 1190-91. The plaintiff, Deltona, had plans to se-
quentially develop a five phase project on Marco Island. Id. at 1188. Two phases were devel-
oped before the regulatory changes by the Army Corps of Engineers. Id. Deltona had all of
the necessary state and local permits for the remaining phases and had entered into con-
tracts for the sale of 90% of the lots in two of the areas. Id. at 1189. Although the court
found that Deltona had been deprived of a reasonable investment-backed expectation, it
was held that a taking had not occurred. Id. at 1192-94. Citing language from Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., the court found that there was no taking because Deltona had never been given
assurances that it would be allowed to develop according to its original plans. Id. at 1193.
Furthermore, it was found that Deltona's residual economic enterprises on Marco Island
were substantial and that the regulations to which Deltona was subjected were uniformly
enforced nationwide. Id. at 1192.
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erty.7' The owner of a residential lot may challenge an ordinance
which mandates increased lot sizes on the ground that it amounts
to a taking because it prevents residential construction, assuming
that is the only viable use of the parcel. Such challenges would
ordinarily be successful, since the owner would seem to have met
the burden of showing that there were no remaining reasonable
uses for his lot,7 2 unlike cases in which a landowner was only pre-
vented from using his land for its highest and best use.
In summary, current Florida case law indicates that, even as-
suming a substantial public interest, an increased lot size require-
ment for a single lot could constitute a taking if the landowner
establishes that he will lack any other reasonable use for the lot he
owns, and such a rule would ordinarily apply to a lot in an unde-
veloped subdivision. As discussed earlier, however, the major lot
sale subdivisions in Charlotte Harbor may create problems calling
for a different conclusion.
A court which might find it unfair to preclude a single lot owner
from developing an otherwise ordinary residential lot might refrain
from providing the same right to owners of several hundred thou-
sand lots in an area as large as the platted lands and thereby de-
prive public authorities of any effective regulatory response to a
problem which is by definition far larger in scope. 4 The judiciary
71. See Ex parte Wise, 192 So. 872, 875 (Fla. 1940) (well-established principle that when
application of zoning ordinance completely deprives owner of beneficial use of property,
ordinance should be altered to prevent confiscation without compensation).
72. See Miami Shore Village v. Ellis, 53 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. 1951) (Thomas, J. concur-
ring) (per curiam) (where zoning law effectively prevents construction on owner's fifty-foot
lot, no reasonable use remains and constitutional guarantees have been invaded); Graves v.
Bloomfield Planning Bd., 235 A.2d 51, 55-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (the settled
rule in most jurisdictions is that "a municipality may not destroy the economic value of an
isolated lot by retroactively prohibiting the erection thereon of a single-family dwelling
through adoption of a zoning ordinance prescribing minimum lot size requirements unless
relief is available to the owner of such undersized lot"); Long Island Land Research Bureau
v. Young, 159 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) (when minimum lot size regulation
bars property from any practical use for which suited, owner must be compensated). It may
be significant that in Miami Shore Village it was not apparent from the opinion whether
there was a showing of environmental considerations in support of the ordinance.
73. See, e.g., S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1978) (zoning ordinance which prohibited use of land that would double value of land
did not constitute a taking).
74. This discussion again grows out of specific situations not involving parcels of land of
the scope involved in the platted subdivisions. The cases indicate that where the impact of
government regulation is widespread and does not appear to single out a specific owner of
land, treating similarly situated landowners the same, the governmental action is more
likely to be upheld. Thus a doctrine which might suggest a taking in the case of a few lots
might not fit the situation where regulations affect many lots.
PLATTED LANDS
might be especially deferential to governmental action if offered
significant justification for the action,"8 and if it was determined
that the purchasers of these lots lacked significant and justifiable
investment-backed expectations.
Many lot owners may appear to be primarily speculators rather
than deferred users.7 6 An individual lot has little value on the open
market because it is competing with the lot sales force of the de-
veloper and the other lot owners desiring to sell their lots, meaning
there may be no market for a lot unless the developer chooses to
make one. Moreover, some of the expectations of land purchasers
may be unjustified by the physical aspects of the affected parcels
themselves.77 In this regard, it is conceivable that, given a sufficient
need, a court would sustain a rezoning of the platted lands to a
lower density even though it would make single lots unsuitable for
building because the platted lot owner is deemed to have a more
limited entitlement from the outset. Such a course would, however,
mark a significant departure from traditional rules and require a
strong showing of an important reason necessitating the change.
If a number of contiguous lots are held by a single owner and a
zoning ordinance increases the lot size requirements for construc-
tion on those lots such that none of them, alone, are of sufficient
size, will the owner of the contiguous lots, like owners of individual
lots, have a significant taking argument that the lots should be ex-
empt from the ordinance? If the owner is able to comply with the
75. See Town of Indialantic v. McNulty, 400 So. 2d 1227, 1232-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
(where important public interest such as protection of coastal wetlands is at stake, owner
has heavier burden of showing that intended use will not likely result in the harm that the
ordinance seeks to prevent, and a balancing between public harm prevented and derogation
of individual property rights is appropriate). In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), the United States Supreme Court noted that the taking question "necessarily re-
quires a weighing of private and public interests." Id. at 261.
76. Cf. Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d 860, 864 (Vt. 1974) (upholding a tax on gain de-
rived from short term sales of Vermont land in part because of its rational relationship to
the legitimate goal of deterrence of speculation). The court said:
We may take judicial notice of an increasing concern within the State over the use
and development of land as a natural resource, a concern to which the legislature
has responded in other instances with appropriate legislation. . . . Speculation
falls within the ambit of such concern as a land use; indeed it has a bearing on
many other uses to which the land might be put.
Id. at 863.
77. In short, the use of a test such as interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations is really an exercise in circular reasoning unless some initial content can be
given to what expectations are in fact reasonable. The planning process may aid in disclos-
ing the range of reasonable expectations. Or put another way, even if no regulation was to
be undertaken, a lot purchaser might find that there are physical constraints on the prop-
erty that would preclude using the land.
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ordinance by consolidating his lots and then building at a density
in accordance with the new standards, the taking argument is con-
siderably weakened. 8 In that circumstance, the property value
would merely be diminished and would not be destroyed.7 9 As one
Florida court has stated, "[a] zoning ordinance is not invalid
merely because it prevents the owner from using the property in
the manner which is economically most advantageous." 0 There is,
then, a strong argument that an increase in lot size requirements
would not constitute a taking against owners of contiguous lots
which could be combined to meet the new requirements.
In summary, if police power validity was established, owners of
multiple lots might find it difficult to show that a taking has oc-
curred according to the criteria set forth in Estuary Properties.81
There would not be a physical invasion of the land and the pur-
pose of the ordinance would, arguably, not be an excessive interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations.82 As stated above, how-
ever, single-lot owners may make a more substantial challenge.
2. Special Permits
Special permits have historically been used to provide local gov-
ernment with some degree of administrative discretion in regulat-
ing a particular form of new development. Schools and churches,
for example, are commonly found in residential zones pursuant to
78. At least one court, however, has found this scenario to be objectionable. In Wood v.
North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964), the municipality increased lot size requirements
and denied a building permit to the plaintiff solely because his lot lacked the necessary
square footage. The municipality argued that adjoining lots owned by the plaintiff could be
used to conform to the new requirement. Id. at 858-59. The court declared that this argu-
ment "loses sight of the fact that one owning two adjoining lots would be subject to the
zoning ordinance, while a neighbor owning but one lot presumably would be either inocu-
lated against the ordinance . .. [or] would be owner of a useless lot.... Such a state of
affairs would seem to be objectionable under simple principles touching discrimination." Id.
at 859.
79. See Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 668, 671
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (where zoning ordinance changed classification of owner's land from
heavy industrial to single-family residential on a minimum of five acre lots, there was no
taking because owner did not demonstrate that his property could not be put to a use com-
patible with the new zoning; evidence that the ordinance resulted in a reduction in the
market value of the property was not sufficient to establish a taking).
80. City of Miami v. Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31, 36 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d
554 (Fla. 1967).
81. See supra text accompanying note 60 for a list of the criteria.
82. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (where the
court held that the frustration of the landowner's investment-backed expectations was in-
sufficient to establish a taking claim).
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special use permits and subject to additional regulations with re-
spect to setback, parking, minimum lot size, and perhaps location
in relation to other uses. The special permit simply provides an
opportunity for the reviewing agency to determine whether devel-
opment in a particular location will create special problems which
can be ameliorated by specifically devised conditions, or whether
the situation requires denial of development permission.
The use of special permits has expanded in recent years beyond
the control of use-type permits to require preconditions for partic-
ular uses, or to limit or time growth. If areas of the platted subdi-
visions create specific problems by their build-out, or if they have
environmental constraints to building, the special permit process
could provide the ability to look more closely at the proposed use,
as well as a better opportunity to deal with possible adverse im-
pacts on environmental issues such as water quality and supply.
For example, it might prove feasible to condition the issuance of a
building permit for a canal-front lot in the platted lands upon a
showing that the site plan provides holding swales and sufficient
canal bank vegetation to minimize pollutant runoff from newly in-
stalled impermeable surfaces, such as roofs or driveways.
It should be noted that the conditions for granting special per-
mits are often listed in the ordinance itself and not left to the dis-
cretion of reviewing officials. 83 This places developers, landowners
and builders on notice of the possible problems with the build-out
of the special permit areas. In this way it subtly dissuades private
investment in these areas unless the appplicant is willing to go
through the heightened review process. For developers, builders
and speculators, it provides guidance as to where public policy
desires investment to be made and not to be made.
The terms "special permit," "special exception" and "condi-
tional use permit" are virtually synonomous. They all refer to ad-
ministrative permission to use land for a specified purpose within a
zoning district.8 4 Special exceptions have been defined by statute
in Florida as uses which "would not be appropriate generally or
without restriction throughout the particular zoning district .. .
but which, if controlled as to number, area, location, or relation to
83. See City of Naples v. Central Plaza of Naples, Inc., 303 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 2d DCA
1974) (city council, in rejecting application for special exception, did not have right to con-
sider whether proposed construction would increase amount of traffic and result in over-
population which would strain utilities and other services because these factors were not
delineated in ordinance).
84. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2D § 19.01, at 357-58 (1977).
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the neighborhood, would not adversely affect the public health,
safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, morals, and
the general welfare.""6
With this mechanism, legislative bodies of local governments au-
thorize certain uses within a zoning district subject to specified
conditions. An administrative body is appointed to ascertain
whether the conditions have been met. If the conditions are met, it
is the administrative body's duty to grant the special permit or
special exception unless it also determines that such use would ad-
versely affect the public interest." Section 163.225(2)(b), Florida
Statutes, provides: "In granting any special exception, the board
shall find that such grant will not adversely affect the public
interest."87
Like most other states, Florida has enacted enabling legislation
which empowers municipalities to authorize a board of adjustment
to grant special exceptions.8 Municipal ordinances which create
special exceptions must include the requisite conditions which are
necessary to qualify for a special exception.8a
Special exceptions are challenged most frequently as improper
delegations of legislative authority. The aggrieved party claims
that the ordinance in question contains standards which are not
sufficiently restrictive for the guidance of the board of adjustment.
The Florida courts have adhered to the "traditional approach" to
this issue.90 This approach holds that the constitutional principles
of separation of powers and due process require meaningful legisla-
tive standards and, to a lesser extent, procedural safeguards. The
most recent enunciation of this doctrine appeared in Askew v.
85. FLA. STAT. § 163.170(6) (1981).
86. See Odham v. Petersen, 398 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (once ordinance
criteria is established, board has duty to grant the special exception unless it finds the use
to be adverse to the public interest).
87. FLA. STAT. § 163.225(2)(b) (1981); see Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County,
315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ("where the applicant has otherwise complied with
those conditions set forth in the zoning code, the burden is upon the zoning authority to
demonstrate by competent substantial evidence that the special exception is adverse to the
public interest"; applicant is permitted use unless zoning authority finds that pursuant to
standards in ordinance it is adverse to public interest) (emphasis in original).
88. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.220(1), .225(2) (1981).
89. Id. at § 163.225(2)(a). In City of St. Petersburg v. Schweitzer, 297 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla.
2d DCA 1974), an ordinance providing for special exceptions was held to be invalid because
the commission's procedure for determining whether a special exception should be granted
was created independently of the ordinance.
90. Martin, Legislative Delegations of Power and Judicial Review - Preventing Judi-
cial Impotence, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 43, 43-44 (1980).
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Cross Key Waterways,91 where the Florida Supreme Court held
that the relatively precise criteria contained in the Florida Envi-
ronmental Land and Water Management Act of 197292 for deter-
mining whether a geographic area should be designated an Area of
Critical State Concern was insufficient because it did not establish
priorities which could be ascertained by a reviewing court."3 The
legislation was held to have effectively delegated policy decisions
to an administrative agency in contravention of article II, section
3, of the Florida Constitution."
With proper drafting, a special permit process may provide a
means of better dealing with problems created by build-out of the
platted lands by providing local government with the opportunity
to place reasonable conditions on development approval.
What if the application of a special permit requirement made a
lot incapable of improvement? In this regard, the issues discussed
previously concerning rezoning again become relevant. Without re-
capitulating that discussion, a valid and important planning or en-
vironmental reason for the permit condition, especially one arising
from new information, should make the permit condition sustaina-
91. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
92. Ch. 72-317, 1972 Fla. Laws 1162 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10
(1981)). The criteria for designating an area of critical state concern is found at FLA. STAT. §
380.05(2) (1981).
93. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 919, 925.
94. Id. at 925. The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was not based
on the use of words such as "significant impact" and "significant effect" because such ap-
proximations are a necessity in legislation. Id. at 919. The seminal case for construing the
delegation of powers issue in the context of special exceptions is Drexel v. City of Miami
Beach, 64 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1953). In Drexel, the Florida Supreme Court considered an ordi-
nance which regulated the construction of multiple-level automobile parking garages. The
ordinance provided that no such structures were to be built in a designated area except
upon "approval and permit by the City Council . . . after a public hearing at which due
consideration shall be given to the effect upon traffic of the proposed use." Id. at 318. The
court found the statute void because the condition that "due consideration" be given was
too lax and inexact. Id. at 319. Such language could "easily become . . . an instrument of
discrimination" and "ripen into a power that would take away property" in violation of the
Florida and United States Constitutions. Id.
For two examples of out-of-state cases in which special exception ordinances were held
not to involve an improper delegation of power, see Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 104
A.2d 568, 570 (Md. 1954) (statutory authorization to empower zoning commissioner to issue
special permits for restaurants and other commercial uses in residential areas when they are
in accord with basic purposes and intent of zoning regulations is valid delegation of legisla-
tive power), and State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219,
224 (Wis.) (ordinance authorizing issuance of building permit upon finding that architec-
tural plan of building would not be so at variance with neighboring structures that substan-
tial depreciation of neighborhood would occur held to be sufficiently definite and therefore
valid), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
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ble even though it adversely affects some pre-existing lots. This is
especially so if the permit condition does not deny the right to
build outright but places upon the owner the burden of proof to
show that a reasonable environmental safeguard will be met.9a The
most difficult situation, of course, is where it is practically impossi-
ble to satisfy a required permit condition. A court is then faced
with the problem that a new development condition may mean a
platted lot (or group of lots) may not be buildable at all. Again,
where a large parcel of land consisting of contiguous lots is in-
volved, some uses may still remain, such as agriculture, timber,
livestock grazing or significant recreation (golf, tennis, etc.). What
if one lot is involved, however, and the lot is realistically too small
for the foregoing uses to have much meaning? In such a situation a
court must decide whether to invalidate the condition as applied to
that lot and defeat the public interest, or let it stand and adversely
affect the lot owner's interest. Here, the conventional rule would
protect the landowner, or at least force the government to decide
whether it wants to limit his use, but only after payment of just
compensation for the restriction imposed."' While the outcome is
uncertain, the chance of the special permit requirement being up-
held as a valid exercise of governmental authority improves signifi-
cantly if the condition relates to the specific characteristics of the
lot or to the prevention of a specific environmental or other type of
harm. 7
95. The state of Vermont, for example, places upon an applicant for a permit for a major
subdivision or development the burden of showing compliance with six criteria (out of ten),
relating to pollution, water supply, soil erosion conformance to any state plans, and local or
regional capital programs. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6086(a)(1)-(10), 6088 (1973). Pursuant
to an administrative rule, Vermont has allowed issuance of a permit or a certification of
compliance by a state agency to create a rebuttable presumption that specified criteria have
been met. D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 378 (1976).
96. See FLA. STAT. chs. 73-74 (1981 and Supp. 1982) (outlining procedure for condemna-
tion of private property by eminent domain and payment of just compensation) (amended
1983).
97. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768, 772 (Wis. 1972) (shoreland wet-
land conservation law upheld); see also Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use
Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (1976), arguing:
The most offensive uses will give way, regardless of the offender's economic loss.
But uses vary in their degree of harm, as do opinions on the nature of harm; and
as we move from more to less harmful uses, or as the consensus over harmfulness
weakens, we become increasingly aware of what regulation costs the offender. At
some point, his hardship may well outweigh the perceived benefit which the com-
munity gains from removal of a "harmful" use. At that point, further regulation
may then be deemed a taking.
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3. Moratoria
A moratorium is generally a total ban of all of a particular type
of building for a temporary period of time. The reasons for use of
moratoria on development or building are to provide government
the opportunity to plan or rezone without the pressure of permit
applications being filed while the action is being undertaken; to
prevent building which may not be in conformance with new re-
quirements; and to provide time for more orderly and professional
consideration of planning or rezoning efforts. The use of a morato-
rium places everyone on notice that the "rules of the game" may
change and creates, in the case of platted lands, a concern that if
investment decisions are to be made then perhaps they should be
made outside moratorium areas.
While a plan for the platted lands is being considered, it may be
advisable to enact a moratorium in certain areas to temporarily
prevent further development until the planning process has been
completed and permanent controls have been prepared to imple-
ment the plan.98 The moratorium would serve to encourage and
protect the planning process and to preserve the status quo while
the permanent plan is being developed. Temporary measures
adopted during the preparation of a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance are generally held to be valid when they are based on a rea-
sonable period of time to complete the study and implement the
ordinance."
4. Eminent Domain
Where restriction of land use is not permissible because of the
limits on the exercise of the police power, an alternative method to
accomplish the same result may be through a land use restriction
acquired by purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. The purchase option is simply the offer to buy the restric-
tion or the entire fee. If accepted at the price offered, there is no
problem. Where voluntary purchase is not possible, eminent do-
98. Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling Growth, 1974 INST. ON
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 147, 151-52.
99. See, e.g., Jason v. Dade County, 37 Fla. Supp. 190 (Cir. Ct. Dade Cty. 1972), aff'd,
278 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
The legislature may validly authorize the cities and counties to adopt "interim" or "stop-
gap" ordinances to place a moratorium on the development of certain areas for a reasonable
period of time. Property owners affected by such ordinances would not be entitled to com-
pensation for the limitation on the use of their property. 1972 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 15.
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main may be used, subject to certain restrictions. 0 "
In addition, it might prove useful to consider not a partial or full
fee acquisition, but a purchase or taking of a partial interest for a
specific period so that integrated land management of scattered
parcels could occur.101
5. Selected Statutory Authority for State and Local Govern-
ment Action
An area in which jurisdiction of the State of Florida would spe-
cifically impact the platted lands is the statutory requirement that
any sanitary wastes discharged into Charlotte Harbor or any tribu-
tary thereof must be treated by advanced sewage treatment meth-
ods if deemed necessary by the Department of Environmental Reg-
ulation (DER). 102 Presently, septic tank systems or domestic
sewage treatment plants with a daily flow of 2,000 gallons or less
(typical single-family homes) are exempted from compliance with
the statute.103 The platted lands in the three county area could be
specifically designated as an area not exempted by statute, with
encouragement by the state, either through funding or regulation,
for the construction of municipal treatment facilities for some ar-
eas and a special permit approach for individual septic tanks.
The state also has the authority to regulate water use.'" All con-
sumptive users of water may be required to obtain a permit from
the DER.10 5 To obtain this permit, an applicant must show that
the proposed use is a reasonable and beneficial use of the water,
will not interfere with any presently existing legal uses of water,
and is consistent with the public interests.'" In relation to the
platted lands, drilling of wells of less than two inches in diameter
and domestic usage of water are not regulated by the state. How-
100. The limits of the eminent domain power are explored in Section III(D)(3), Reas-
sembly by Eminent Domain.
101. An example here is a taking of an easement for a ten year period to provide time for
planning. During this period crops could be grown on the land.
102. FLA. STAT. § 403.086(1)(a) (1981).
103. CHARLOTTE HARBOR: A FLORIDA RESOURCE, supra note 2, states that the present
package treatment plants are not adequately maintained by owners in the three county plat-
ted lands area. This problem should be examined to determine if it is a significant hazard to
public health and welfare, or if it is adversely affecting the natural environment. See also
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 17.4.04(1)-(2) (1982) (exempting septic tanks and domestic sewage
treatment plants from requirements of state permitting).
104. FLA. STAT. § 373.016 (1981).
105. FLA. STAT. § 373.219(1) (1981).
106. FLA. STAT. § 373.223(1) (1981).
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ever, the DER or a local water management district may require
that prior permission for any water well be obtained to "protect
the groundwater resources.' 07 There is a subsection that allows a
well if failure to issue this prior permission would place an undue
hardship on the applicant. 08 As with the septic system issue, cer-
tain areas of the three counties could be regulated by the enforce-
ment of this statute.
The dredging and filling statutes of the state may also be rele-
vant to the continued development and build-out of the platted
lands, particularly for maintenance of existing canals or installa-
tion of new canals. The DER has the authority to review and ap-
prove any permits for the dredging and filling of navigable
waters.' 0
Charlotte, Lee and Sarasota counties have the authority to regu-
late land uses.110 They also have the power to establish and admin-
ister programs related to housing, slum clearance, redevelopment,
and flood and beach erosion,"' and are authorized to "[pirovide
and regulate waste and sewage collection and disposal, water sup-
ply, and conservation programs.""'
Additionally, the counties have the authority to establish munic-
ipal service taxing or benefit units for any or all parts of unincor-
porated areas of the counties." 3 The units may be used to provide
fire protection, recreation facilities, water, waste and sewage dispo-
sal, drainage and other essential services and facilities, by levying
service charges, special assessments or taxes within such units.""
Counties are also empowered to create special districts in incorpo-
107. FLA. STAT. § 373.313(1) (1981).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. chs. 253, 403 (1981) (amended 1983). Navigable waters are defined under
the statutes as the mean water line for tidal waters and the ordinary high water line for non-
tidal waters. The DER also has the authority to review and approve permits for dredging
and filling other waters of the state, particularly rivers, streams, bays, bayous, estuaries, and
natural lakes. Permitting for both of these activities is done in conjunction with the United
States Army Corps of Engineers. The DER may look at the total effect of any proposed
dredging or filling project on the water body. The applicant must show the DER that the
proposal will not violate the applicable water standards for the respective body of water.
Existing man-made canals and similar structures and intermittent water sources caused by
heavy rainfall are specifically exempted from the provisions of the statute. See also FLA.
ADMIN. CODE R. 17.4.04(10) (1982) (full description of exemptions); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R.
17.4.04(2) (1982) (description of waterways covered by statute).
110. FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01(1)(h), 163.175(2), .205(1), .260(1) (1981).
111. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(j) (1981).
112. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(k) (1981).
113. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q) (1981).
114. Id.
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rated and unincorporated areas within which municipal services
and facilities may be provided from funds derived from service
charges, special assessments, and taxes levied within such
districts." 6
The counties, therefore, either separately, jointly or with local
municipalities, could establish sewage treatment districts." 6 These
districts could regulate the number of septic tank permits, sewer
tie-ins and treatment plants throughout the subdivisions under
their jurisdiction. In conjunction with water management districts,
the counties could more closely regulate both the supply and the
conservation of water throughout the platted subdivisions.
Counties, through the power of eminent domain, may also ac-
quire any land necessary to fulfill their duties.1 7 As related to the
platted lands in the three county area, any of the counties may
acquire land necessary for county facilities. The major limitation is
that in any judicial review of the county's action, the county must
show the necessity of the condemnation." 8
At the municipal level, article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida
Constitution allows municipalities to exercise all the governmental,
corporate and proprietary powers necessary to conduct municipal
functions and to exercise those powers for municipal purposes." 9
Also, under the authorization of the Community Redevelopment
Act of 1969,120 counties and municipalities may set up a commu-
nity redevelopment agency to deal with the problems of "blighted
areas."'
2 1
115. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(5)(a) (1981).
116. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(I)(p) (1981).
117. FLA. STAT. § 127.01 (1981).
118. FLA. STAT. § 127.01(2) (1981). In Dade County v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1972), the court stated that the county's burden under this statute is to show there is a
"reasonable necessity" for the taking. Id. at 458. The court held that the condemnation of
180 acres for park purposes in an area in close proximity to 250,000 residents was reasonably
necessary in light of testimony that there was a shortage of park facilities. Id.
119. Municipal purpose is defined as "any activity or power which may be exercised by
the state or its political subdivisions." FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1981). A further provision of
the statute allows municipalities "the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the
constitution." FLA. STAT. § 166.021(4) (1981). Therefore, unless specifically prohibited or
preempted by the Florida Constitution, statute, or case law, local municipalities have a great
deal of power.
120. Ch. 69-305, 1969 Fla. Laws 1075 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-.450
(1981) (amended 1983)).
121. FLA. STAT. § 163.356 (1981). "Blighted areas" are defined as either:
a) An area in which there are a substantial number of slum, deteriorated or dete-
riorating structures . . . or one or more of the following factors which substan-
tially impairs. . . the sound growth of a county or municipality and is a menace
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In establishing the redevelopment agency, the county or munici-
pality may grant the agency the power of eminent domain. 22 Any
land acquired may be used by the agency or sold, leased, or other-
wise transferred by the agency subject to covenants and restric-
tions on the land as to its use. All such transactions are subject to
review by the governing board of the respective municipality or
county.l s
This statute is geared primarily toward redevelopment of urban
areas in Florida. While there is language relating to faulty street
and lot layout, there is an unresolved question of whether the stat-
ute is inapplicable to the platted lands areas except in partially
developed portions of the subdivisions.
Coordinating the tools available to local government to address
platted lands issues can be done through the local comprehensive
plan. The policy guidance included in the plan could serve as a
framework for governmental action.
C. Timing, Locating and Paying for Development of Platted
Lands
1. Capital Facilities and Development Phasing
Control of the amount, rate, or location of building, or of all
three, may be desirable in the platted subdivisions. Use of timing
to the public health, safety, morals or welfare in its present condition and use:
1. Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout;
2. Faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or
usefulness;
3. Unsanitary or unsafe conditions;
4. Deterioration of site or other improvements;
5. Tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the
land; and
6. Diversity of ownership or defective or unusual conditions of title
which prevent the free alienability of land within the deteriorated or haz-
ardous area;
or
b) An area in which there exists faulty or inadquate street layout; . . . or road-
ways, bridges, or public transportaion facilities incapable of handling the volume
of traffic flow into or through the area, either at present or following proposed
construction.
FLA. STAT. § 163.340(8) (1981).
122. FLA. STAT. § 163.375 (1981).
123. A restriction in the program is that real property belonging to the United States,
the state, or any political subdivision of the state may not be acquired by eminent domain
without its consent. id. The agency is also under constraints to show that, in any judicial
review, the taking is reasonably necessary.
554 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:505
and location mechanisms requires a high degree of sophisticated
front-end planning, and requires a municipal commitment to a
phased capital facilities program to serve the growth that will be
allowed in conformance to the phasing plan.
This type of action restricts building in areas not provided with
specific services and facilities, and establishes a program and a
timetable for provision of facilities and services so that the time of
allowed development will be reasonably ascertainable. Again, this
would foster investment decisions in desired areas not yet appro-
priate for build-out.""'
THE EFFECTS OF EXISTING OR COMMITTED CAPITAL FACILITIES.
Time controls on land development have been referred to as a
"bridge over troubled waters. ' ..5 The present build-out of Char-
lotte Harbor's platted lands constitutes potential troubled waters
for the three counties, over which phased development linked to a
capital improvement program may offer a bridge.
The town of Ramapo, New York, pioneered in the field of
growth management linked to a phased capital improvement pro-
gram. Located in an area experiencing rapid growth, the town's
concern about providing services for new development led it to
amend its zoning ordinance to require a special permit for residen-
tial development. The permit could be granted if certain public fa-
cilities, provided either by the town or by the developer, were in
place. The ordinance's purpose was to coordinate land develop-
ment with the town's ability to provide designated facilities and
services. It should be noted, however, that the definition of "devel-
opment" regulated by the ordinance did not include single homes
built for occupancy.
Ramapo's scheme for timing development used a three-phase
plan for development, covering eighteen years in three six-year
phases. Corresponding with this plan was an eighteen-year pro-
gram for the town's installation of capital improvements (sewage,
drainage, fire protection, etc.). The capital improvement program
specified the location and sequence of installation of the necessary
facilities. The town conditioned the issuance of a special permit on
the availability of the necessary capital improvements. A person
wishing to develop property not yet provided with the necessary
124. Cape Coral, for example, apparently has a capital facilities extension program
designed to foster development of close-in areas, but is without a complementary limit on
development in non-service areas.
125. Comment, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Law for Planners, 57 Cos-
NELL L. REV. 827, 847 (1972).
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services would have to provide those services at his own expense in
order to develop the property sooner than called for in the capital
improvement program.
Persons wishing to develop their property sooner than allowed
under the ordinance sued the town alleging that the ordinance de-
stroyed the value and marketability of their property. 126 The New
York Court of Appeals, in a 5-4 decision, held that the ordinance
was constitutional, stating that:
[W]here it is clear that the existing physical and financial re-
sources of the community are inadequate to furnish the essential
services and facilities which a substantial increase in population
requires, there is a rational basis for "phased growth" and hence,
the challenged ordinance is not violative of the Federal and State
Constitutions.1 2
7
Ramapo's plan for phased development, though rather simple,
has been considered as opening up a new era in American planning
law. Since Ramapo, other local governments, using different meth-
ods, have attempted to phase or limit growth. 128
Ramapo held that phasing growth, where the government was
unable to provide necessary services, was permissible since the lack
of services jeopardized the health, safety, and general welfare of
future residents. The decision provides strong support for the idea
that phased zoning is consistent with the traditional goals of zon-
ing ordinances. e12 Therefore, even without using its zoning author-
ity, a local government's control over the development or improve-
ment of services within its jurisdiction may be a significant tool for
126. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
127. Id. at 304-05.
128. For example, Boca Raton, Florida (population cap); Petaluma, California and Boul-
der, Colorado (limitation on number of building permits with issuance based on merit sys-
tem). For a discussion of these growth management programs, see Harwell, Growth Manage-
ment Workshop, ENVTL. COMMENT, June 1979, at 3.
129. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 303; Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo
and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REV. 585, 591, 595 (1974). Courts, as a
general rule, have been reluctant to abridge the power of local government to make policy
concerning the extension of services, holding that decisions relating to the allocation of pub-
lic funds are better made by the local officials than by judges. E.g., Browne v. City of Ben-
tonville, 126 S.W. 93, 94 (Ark. 1910); Marr v. City of Glendale, 181 P. 671,673 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1919); Moore v. City Council, 105 S.W. 926, 926 (Ky. 1907); Rose v. Plymouth Town,
173 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1946). But see Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
89 A.2d 667, 671 (N.J. 1952) (was abuse of discretion for governing body to use grant of
extension of public facilities in order to coerce landowner to accept minimum lot-size
restrictions).
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effective long-range land use planning that does not have the limi-
tations of many other methods."'0
THE IMPORTANCE OF A CAPITAL FACILITIES PLAN. If the three
counties plan and zone for the platted lands so as to phase devel-
opment in certain areas, the standard that would be applied on
judicial review is the fairly debatable test. So long as it can be ar-
gued that the purpose of the ordinance is reasonably related to the
protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the action
should be upheld."'1
Meeting the challenge of managing growth requires careful plan-
ning.'s' By (1) projecting future demand for development in the
platted lands, (2) establishing a capital improvement plan to meet
that demand within the fiscal restraints of the counties, and (3)
incorporating those plans into the counties' comprehensive plans
and zoning ordinances, and requiring the necessary capital im-
provements to be made prior to the issuance of a building permit,
the counties could have a plan for phased development in selected
portions of the platted lands similar to the Town of Ramapo's
phased development plan.
So long as the landowners are not precluded from using their
property within a reasonable time, the ordinance should be able to
withstand the ordinary zoning challenge. In Moviematic Industries
Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners,33 the Third District
Court of Appeals stated that "[z]oning regulations which are rea-
sonably related to the adequacy of governmental services fall
within the established purpose of the public health, safety and wel-
fare. . . Therefore, zoning ordinances have been sustained be-
cause of their tendency to insure that such essential governmental
services . ..will be provided."'3"
To prevent further development from taking place in the desig-
nated platted lands areas, thereby frustrating any plan to phase
130. THE USE OF LAND, supra note 9, at 125-26. It has been suggested that the town of
Ramapo reduced development at the expense of neighboring communities, which absorbed
the development which would have occurred there and thereby developed at an increased
rate. Busselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole
World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234, 234-35 (1973). If that assessment is valid, then truly so-
phisticated growth management through development timing requires enforceable regional
planning policies. Id. at 244.
131. See discussion in text at Section III(B)(1), Rezoning to Lower Density.
132. See generally Comment, One Tier Beyond Ramapo: Open Space Zoning and the
Urban Reserve, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1211 (1978) (discussion of the validity of police power
implementation of phased growth regulations).
133. 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
134. Id. at 669.
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development of the area or to redevelop the area, the local govern-
ments involved could declare a moratorium on development pend-
ing the preparation and implementation of a plan for phasing de-
velopment. 13 5 That plan should be part of the comprehensive plan
and be tied into a capital improvement program for maintenance
and improvement of public facilities and services. Barring a suc-
cessful suit based upon vested rights or equitable estoppel,13' the
withholding of building permits or zoning changes because of tem-
porary inadaquacy of public facilities should be approved by the
courts because such a regulation would be reasonably related to
the public health, safety, or welfare. 3
2. Impact Fees
Impact fees or similar types of assessments can often require
new development to help pay the costs of development. To the ex-
tent that the charges reflect the true cost of new services or facili-
ties extended to an outlying development site, they may in fact
have a regulatory effect resulting in some development not being
considered where service and facility costs make building
financially unfeasible. Some consideration therefore could be given
to impact fees based on distance (or some related criterion) from
existing facilities such as roads, sewers and so forth.
Impact fees are charges levied by local governments in order to
raise funds for capital improvements which are necessitated by
new development.'3 Unlike exactions or "in lieu fees," which often
are levied at the time the land is platted, impact fees are usually
collected when building permits are issued. 39 Impact fees, there-
fore, are arguably appropriate where land was platted before local
governments imposed exactions or in lieu fees as preconditions to
135. See discussion in text at Section III(B)(3), Moratoria.
136. See Rhodes, These Rights Are Mine, 50 FLA. B.J. 586 (1976) and discussion in text
at Section III(B)(1), under the subheading "GRANDFATHERED RIGHTS" OR VESTED RIGHTS
AND ESTOPPEL.
137. The local governments, however, should also reassess the taxable status of these
platted lands not presently allowed to be developed under the plan. Where the action of
local government prevents the development of one's property, and at the same time the
government continues to collect taxes, thereby consuming what value the property may
have, the local government's refusal to allow development may amount to a taking of prop-
erty without compensation. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 647 (Fla. 1941).
138. Juergensmeyer, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding
Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 417 (1981).
139. Id. at 418, 419.
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plat approval.140 With this mechanism, local governments in the
three county area can assess newcomers in order to finance the in-
creased services which they require. Furthermore, impact fees can
help to alleviate the "time lag" problem which exists when incom-
ing residents create the need for expanded services, and the new
tax base which they are creating is not yet generating adequate
revenue to pay for those services.' 41 Again, because the charges will
defray the costs of new services and facilities extended to an outly-
ing development site, impact fees may have the effect of discourag-
ing build-out where service and facility costs are prohibitively
expensive.
In assessing the legal problems associated with enacting impact
fee ordinances in Florida, two issues arise. First, there must be
valid statutory authority. In this regard, it is important that the
impact fee be framed so that it is construed to be a regulation and
not a tax. Local taxes in Florida must be specifically authorized by
general statute and cannot be inferred from broad delegations of
authority.' The second legal concern is that the impact fee be
drafted such that it meets the requirements for a valid exercise of
the police power."I3
There is limited statutory authority in Florida for local govern-
ments to impose impact fees in order to raise money to expand
water and sewerage systems. In Contractors & Builders Associa-
tion v. City of Dunedin,"" the plaintiffs challenged a municipal
ordinance which authorized the municipality to charge an impact
fee, payable upon issuance of the building permit, in order to de-
fray the costs of increased water and sewerage facilities." 5 The
Florida Supreme Court found that this was authorized by section
180.13(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that "the 'legislative
body of the municipality ...may establish just and equitable
140. Id. at 420.
141. J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RESTRICTIONS § 1701 (rev. ed.
1979); Note, Impact Fees: National Perspectives to Florida Practice; A Review of
Mandatory Land Dedications and Impact Fees that Affect Land Developments, 4 NovA
L.J. 137, 140 (1980).
142. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a). Ad valorem taxes do not require statutory authority,
but are subject to a ten mill cap. See generally Note, supra note 141, at 176-77.
143. See discussion in text at Section II(C)(1), under the subheading THE POLICE POWER.
144. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
145. The challenged portion of the ordinance required connection charges for the instal-
lation of meters and mandated that there "shall be paid an assessment to defray the cost of
production, distribution, transmission and treatment facilities for water and sewer provided
at the expense of the City of Dunedin." Id. at 316 n.1.
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rates or charges' for water and sewerage. ''146
Whether there is sufficient statutory authority to enable the im-
position of impact fees for educational, recreational, or transporta-
tion purposes is more problematic, for Florida does not have a spe-
cific statute authorizing capital cost shifting for those purposes.
Commentators have suggested, however, that general constitu-
tional and statutory grants of authority to counties, municipalities,
and towns may constitute a sufficient statutory basis. 1 7 For exam-
ple, municipalities have home rule powers derived from the Florida
Constitution 8  and the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act. 149
Under these provisions, municipal corporations have "governmen-
tal, corporate and proprietary powers" and "may exercise any
power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by
law."150
However, in Broward County v. Janis Development Corp.,151 the
court held that an impact fee which was imposed in order to pay
for roads was a tax and therefore was invalid because there was no
statutory authorization. The court found the fee to be a tax be-
cause (1) it was imposed solely for revenue purposes and (2) there
were no specifics in the ordinance as to where and when the money
was to be expended.' 5 '
In Dunedin, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that
sewer connection fees were not a tax. The court indicated that the
146. Id. at 319.
147. Juergensmeyer, supra note 138, at 434-38.
148. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
149. Ch. 73-129, 1973 Fla. Laws 238 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 166.011-.043
(1981)). Specifically, the powers stem from § 166.021.
150. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
Chartered counties have "all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general
law." FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b). Non-chartered counties, like chartered counties, have
been granted statutory home rule powers. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1981). In Speer v. Olson, 367
So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Statutes, § 125.01,
empowered a county to issue general obligation bonds to acquire sewer and water systems
and to pledge for their payment ad valorem taxes. The court stated that "[u]nless the Legis-
lature has pre-empted a particular subject relating to county government by either general
or special law, the county governing body, by reason of this [statute], has full authority to
act through the exercise of home rule power." Id. at 211.
Ch. 69-139, 1969 Fla. Laws 642 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160-.315 (1981))
(relating to county and municipal planning for future development) and the Local Govern-
ment Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 have also been suggested as possible sources of
statutory authority for local governments. Juergensmeyer, supra note 138, at 437.
151. 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
152. Id. at 375. The court noted that the city anticipated six million dollars in revenue
from the fees and concluded that "it is impossible that such revenue could approximate any
cost of regulation." Id.
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impact fees in that case were distinguishable from those in Janis
because the use of the proceeds was clearly limited to meeting the
costs of expansion. 153 The court concluded that when revenues
raised in this manner are sufficiently earmarked for their intended
use, the impact fees do not constitute a tax.154 Thus, there is a
basis for arguing that impact fees, like subdivision exactions and in
lieu fees, should be upheld.
Although the standard used for assessing the validity of impact
fees in Florida has not been definitively expressed, the courts seem
inclined to favor the "rational nexus" requirement, as expressed by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Jordan v. Village of Me-
nomonee Falls.5 5 In that case, the court upheld in lieu fees im-
posed upon a developer for educational and recreational purposes
because of the "rational connection" between the need for new fa-
cilities and the new growth caused by the new subdivision, and be-
cause the funds acquired were restricted to benefitting the new
subdivision. s5 The test was met if (1) the approval of subdivision
plats had required the local government to expend significant sums
for park and school lands and the expansion of public facilities, (2)
the expenditures were made necessary by the influx of people into
these subdivisions, and (3) the expenditures were greater than the
amount exacted from the subdividers.157
The Jordan court stated that the rationale for upholding the im-
position of in lieu fees is that the municipality, by approval of a
proposed subdivision plat, benefits the developer and enables him
to profit financially. In return for this benefit the municipality may
require him to make expenditures in order to meet a demand to
which the municipality would not have been put but for the influx
of people into the community to occupy the lots. s1 5
In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,5 9 a Florida ap-
peals court considered whether subdivision exactions were a valid
exercise of the police power. The court dismissed the "reasonable
relation test" as allowing too much governmental latitude "in dero-
153. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 318. The Supreme Court of Florida stated: "In contrast [to
Janis], evidence was adduced here that the connection fees were less than costs [the city]
was destined to incur in accommodating new users of its water and sewer systems. We join
many other courts in rejecting the contention that such connection fees are taxes." Id.
154. Id.
155. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
156. Id. at 448-49.
157. Id. at 449.
158. Id. at 448.
159. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
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gation of constitutionally protected property rights." 6 " The court
also rejected the "specifically and uniquely attributable test" be-
cause it is unduly restrictive of the government's ability to impose
land use restrictions."" The court adopted as an intermediate stan-
dard the "rational nexus test" of Jordan, which requires a "reason-
able connection between the required dedication and the antici-
pated needs of the community.' 162 Under this analysis, there is a
balancing of the prospective needs of the community and the prop-
erty rights of the landowners.' s The court concluded that an ordi-
nance which required a developer to dedicate canal rights of way
and maintain easements as a condition of plat approval was a valid
exercise of the police power. 164
The Dunedin decision suggests that the Florida Supreme Court
may be prepared to apply the "rational nexus test" to a considera-
tion of impact fees. In assessing whether an impact fee was a
proper exercise of governmental power, the court used language of
that test: "Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges,
which do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated
costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is reasonably re-
quired, if use of the money collected is limited to meeting the
costs of expansion. "165 In a footnote, the court stated that "perfec-
tion is not the standard of municipal duty" in estimating the pro-
jected costs of expansion.'66
Whether the Florida courts will apply the "rational nexus test"
in determining the validity of impact fees for purposes other than
water and sewerage is yet to be decided. At least one commentator
has suggested that judicial approval of impact fees for a wide vari-
ety of purposes is likely because the courts, cognizant of the plat-
ted lands problems, will be persuaded that there are few viable al-
ternatives for alleviating those problems. 67 It is significant that in
both Jordan and Wald, where the rational nexus test was unequiv-
ocally adopted, the landowners were developers. In Wald, the court
found this fact to be very important and indicated that a different
160. Id. at 866.
161. Id. at 866-67.
162. Id. at 868. For a general discussion of these three tests, see Juergensmeyer, supra
note 138, at 441-43, and Note, supra note 141, at 151-58.
163. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 868.
164. Id. at 868-69.
165. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 320 (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 320 n.10 (quoting Rutherford v. City of Omaha, 160 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Neb.
1968)).
167. Juergensmeyer, supra note 138, at 445.
1983]
562 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:505
standard of review might be appropriate if the affected landowner
was an individual property owner.1 8 In Dunedin, the court was si-
lent on this matter.
3. Taxation
Various forms of taxation are useful to consider as revenue rais-
ing devices. Many of the tax incentives and disincentives that are
most often considered for land preservation purposes, however,
such as preferential tax assessments or land speculation taxes, ap-
pear more appropriate to natural areas which are at risk to new
development and not areas already platted for building lots.
Therefore, these forms of taxation are not discussed here in
depth. 69
Also, taxation of land in its current use is often proposed as an
incentive to retain land in its current state. For example, propo-
nents of agricultural preservation often argue that it is an impor-
tant component of tax relief for a farmer to be taxed on the agri-
cultural land value rather than its potential value as developed
property, a component which mitigates the pressure for a distress
sale. The platted lands are apparently taxed as developable sites.
This produces an expectation on the part of the lot owner that the
property is buildable at the present time. If any regulatory pro-
gram is established to delay the ability to build, changes in the
taxable status of the lots probably should be made. This change
also serves as notice to the lot owner of the changed status of the
property.
To the extent that land use restrictions are imposed on subdi-
vided lots by the exercise of the police power or by condemnation
of an interest in the land, it may prove an important mitigating
element of such restrictions for the lots to be revalued to reflect
their restricted use. 17 0
168. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 868.
169. One aspect of the platted lands problem that offers intriguing possibilities lies in
the fact that many unbuilt lots produce more taxes than they currently consume in services.
It might be feasible to earmark a portion of this increment for a special sinking fund which
could constitute a trust fund for the future use of the platted lands, and earmark the in-
come from this fund to help absorb the extra service costs associated with providing for
future build-out, a situation analogous to the technique of tax increment financing.
Paying for necessary improvements, however, can also be accomplished by the formation
of special taxing districts. See, e.g., Hudson, Special Taxing Districts in Florida, 10 FLA. ST.
U.L* REV. 49 (1982).
170. Instances where the tax system has been used as a disincentive rather than an in-
centive are probably also not applicable here. For example, Vermont imposes a short term
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4. Selected Statutory Authority for State or Local Govern-
ment Action
Siting and construction of capital facilities in Florida are primar-
ily done at the county and municipal level. The state may provide
funds to any political subdivision of the state for any reasons as
may be provided by the general laws.171
At the county level, the county commissioners have the power to
construct, acquire or establish facilities to provide and maintain
county buildings, support fire protection, provide hospitals and
create parks, as well as the power to regulate water supply and
sewage collection. 172
There is an overlap between the powers of municipalities and
counties, though both are encouraged to develop projects jointly.
The overlap and potential conflict becomes real when both a
county and a municipality attempt to construct similar facilities.
Under the statutes, the municipality proposing the facility must
tax on gain from the sale of land held for less than six years. This had an apparent tendency
to reduce the amount of demand for large parcels of Vermont land, especially from out-of-
state speculators. See Baker & Andersen, Taxing Speculative Land Gains: The Vermont
Experience, 22 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1981). But here, the otherwise large parcels have already
been broken up into subdivided lots, and any disincentive is likely to be more usefully
linked to the actual build-out of the lots.
171. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 8. School districts, as such, are separate jurisdictions from
local municipalities and have the right of eminent domain in acquiring land. FLA. STAT. §
235.05 (1981). The state provides funds to schools (separate from the district's taxing
power) under the Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund for con-
struction and maintenance of school buildings. FLA. STAT. § 235.42 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
School districts are encouraged, though, to work closely with local municipalities as to the
siting of new schools. FLA. STAT. § 235.19 (1981).
The federal government has recently shifted the burden of local sewer funding to the
states, and the Florida Legislature responded by passing Part IX of the Water Quality As-
surance Act of 1983, ch. 83-310, §§ 47-60, 1983 Fla. Laws - . This part of the Act, which
amended FLA. STAT. §§ 403.1821-.1835 (1981), resulted in the generation of an estimated
$100 million in funds for sewer grants to local governments, at least 45% of which are to be
reserved for the Small Communities Sewer Construction Assistance Trust Fund for eventual
grants to local governments with a population of 35,000 or less.
172. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1981). The limitation on these items is that county revenues
must be used to provide real and substantial benefits to property or persons within their
jurisdiction. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(7) (1981).
The counties are also authorized to purchase and construct water and sewer systems. FLA.
STAT. § 153.03 (1981). These systems are defined as including all wells, pipes, reservoirs, and
related facilities for present and future uses. FLA. STAT. § 153.02(3) (1981). Financing may
be by water and sewer revenue bond or by special assessment districts, both subject to pro-
cedural safeguards. FLA. STAT. §§ 153.05-.06 (1981). County commissioners may establish
water and sewer districts outside of incorporated areas by petition of persons owning not
less than ten percent of the property within the boundary of the proposed area. FLA. STAT. §
153.53(2) (1981).
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obtain the abutting municipality's or operating entity's consent
prior to facility construction. 173
The state, under chapter 190, Florida Statutes, has endeavored
to deal with the problem posed by these overlapping responsibili-
ties between counties and municipalities in the construction of the
necessary infrastructure. Enacted as the "Uniform Community De-
velopment District Act of 1980," the purpose of the law was to es-
tablish a process by which a local government, developer, or land-
owner could establish a district that would construct, manage, and
finance the necessary facilities to serve the particular area desig-
nated. 17 4 Management and financing of vacant land development
are specifically noted by the legislature as a need requiring a closer
interrelationship between developers and the state, counties, and
local municipalities. 17 5 This management and financing process is
entirely separated from the necessary permitting process in the re-
spective jurisdictions. 7  The Act is now the sole authority for local
municipality or county government attempts to set up any special
district for the provision of infrastructure. 17 7
As related to the platted lands, the Act provides for an alterna-
tive method of financing the major infrastructure for community
developments. 7 8 Upon approval of a community development dis-
173. FLA. STAT. § 180.06 (1981).
174. Uniform Community Development District Act of 1980, ch. 80-407, 1980 Fla. Laws
1628 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 190.001-.049 (1981 & Supp. 1982)). The state-
ment of purpose is found at FLA. STAT. § 190.002 (1981).
175. FLA. STAT. § 190.002(I)(b) (1981).
176. FLA. STAT. § 190.002(2)(c) (1981).
177. FLA. STAT. § 190.004 (1981).
178. A part of the applicable statute's provisions deal with developments over 1,000
acres which, while they may be entirely encompassed within one county or municipality,
still have significant impact across municipal or county lines. FLA. STAT. § 190.002(2) (1981).
A prospective developer or landowner is required to submit a petition to the Florida Land
and Water Adjudicatory Commission. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a) (1981). The petition must
contain, among other things, a description of the boundaries of the district, a map of the
proposed district showing the current water and sewer system, a description of the timetable
of future construction of infrastructure and a designation of future land uses in compliance
with the comprehensive land use plan of the relevant local governmental body. FLA. STAT. §
190.005(1)(a) (1981). There is a requirement that 100% of the landowners in the proposed
district consent to the formation of the district though specific properties within the bound-
aries of the district may be excluded. Id. Owners of such excluded properties must be listed
in the petition. Id. Finally, a designation of a temporary board of supervisors to serve until
members are elected must be included in the petition. Id.
There are notice requirements relating to the holding of a public hearing by a hearing
officer. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(b) (1981). Testimony, both oral and written, is given at the
hearing and the record of the hearing is then considered by the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission, which consists of the Governor and Cabinet. FLA. STAT. §
190.005(I)(b)-(c) (1981). The Commission then renders a decision, based upon the informa-
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trict, a board of supervisors, composed of five members, is elected
for a term of four years by the landowners of the district.M This
board is empowered to exercise the powers granted to the dis-
trict.180 These powers are, among others, (1) to purchase and ac-
quire land and personal property, (2) to contract for services, and
(3) to acquire land by the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main. 81 The board also has special powers, singly or in combina-
tion with other governing bodies, to manage water, sewage and
waste water, including the power of water diversion; to construct
bridges, streets, parks, fire prevention facilities, schools, jails and
street lights; and the specific task to regulate the use and mainte-
nance of private septic and sanitary systems. 2 The development
district may issue bonds to finance these items.18
In addition to these powers, the district may also levy ad
valorem taxes upon property in the district to pay for the bonds, in
addition to any existing county and other ad valorem taxes. 8 4 Ben-
efit taxes may be placed on the properties specifically for payment
of the construction of water management and control facilities. 8 5
A maintenance tax may also be enacted to pay for the continued
upkeep of the water management and control facilities. 8 6
tion in the record and a consideration of six factors, to grant or deny the petition to create
the district. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(c) (1981). Approval for a development district of less
than 1,000 acres is done on a county or municipal basis. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(2) (1981). A
petition containing the same information listed above for developments of over 1,000 acres
is submitted to the appropriate governmental authority. Id. The same procedures for a pub-
lic hearing must also be complied with by the local government entity. FLA. STAT. §
190.005(2)(b) (1981). The county or municipality may render a decision on the petition, or
within 90 days of submission of the petition, the county or municipality may transfer it
(with all approval and denial rights) to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commis-
sion which may then grant or deny the petition. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(2) (1981). Under the
provisions of the Act, any existing special district formulated for the purposes of infrastruc-
ture construction or recreation may petition to be restructured as a community development
district. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(3) (1981).
179. FLA. STAT. § 190.006(1) (1981).
180. Id.
181. FLA. STAT. § 190.011 (1981).
182. FLA. STAT. § 190.012 (1981).
183. FLA. STAT. § 190.016 (1981).
184. FLA. STAT. § 190.021(1) (1981).
185. FLA. STAT. § 190.021(2) (1981).
186. FLA. STAT. § 190.021(3) (1981). There are procedural guidelines that the district
must follow for the issuance of the revenue bonds, the levying and collecting of taxes, and
the attachment of liens to properties that do not pay the taxes. FLA. STAT. §§ 190.016, .021
& .024 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
The Community Development Act also allows liberal expansion, contraction, and termina-
tion of a district. FLA. STAT. § 190.046 (1981). Under this provision a district may petition to
contract or expand the boundaries of the district in a procedure similar to the district estab-
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This district approach appears to provide a possible financing
mechanism to deal with the provision of infrastructure, and its use
around the state should be carefully monitored.
D. Reassembly of Platted Lands
1. Reassembly of Lots in Unitary Ownership by Deplatting
Florida statutes provide for the vacation of approved plats upon
the application of the land developer or, subsequent to the sale of
the subdivision, upon the application of the owners of the subdi-
vided lots. 187 The statutes also provide that the governing body
lishment procedure. FLA. STAT. § 190.046(1) (1981). The district may be wholly merged with
another community development district or transferred to a general purpose local govern-
ment. FLA. STAT. § 190.046(3)-(6) (1981). Specific services of the district may also be trans-
ferred to a local government. FLA. STAT. § 190.046(4) (1981). The charges of the community
development district and the quality and efficiency of the services must be maintained in
any transfer. Id. Review of the transfer ordinance adopted by the local government may be
sought by the district's board of supervisors in the circuit court of the county in which the
local government is located. FLA. STAT. § 190.046(5) (1981).
An additional termination method is provided under § 190.046(7) if within five years from
the effective date of the rule or ordinance creating the district, a landowner has not received
a development permit for some portion or all of the property in the district. FLA. STAT. §
190.046(7) (1981). In this situation, the district is automatically terminated and a circuit
court judge is responsible for the filing of a statement to that effect in the public record. Id.
Presently, seven petitions have been filed for the establishment of a community develop-
ment district. These petitions are for areas in southeast, southwest and central Florida. The
petition for central Florida is a cross-jurisdictional district between Orange County and the
City of Orlando. In the jurisdiction including the platted lands area, the SWFRPC initially
passed and then rescinded a resolution for repeal of the Community Development Act.
Other areas of Florida have not made any resolution regarding the Act, with the exception
of Martin County. In Martin County, a disagreement between a developer and the local
county/municipality which must approve the proposed community development district has
arisen. The governmental body has resolved that the Act should be repealed. There is pres-
ently no litigation or case law involving the statute. Interview with Ken van Assenderp,
author of FLA. STAT. ch. 190 (The Community Development Act), on Aug. 6, 1982.
187. FLA. STAT. § 177.101 (1981).
Many states have statutes which provide for the deplatting of land. The statutes appear
to fall primarily into one of two types: those that provide for owner initiated deplatting, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-407 (1980); IDAHO CODE §§ 50-1306(A), -1317, -1321 (1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 109, §§ 6-7 (Smith-Hurd 1952 & Supp. 1981-82); IND. CODE §§ 36-7-3-10, -7-3-11, -
7-4-712 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 409.18-.22 (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.. § 58-2613
(1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 505.14 (West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-27-31 (1972); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 19-917, 23-110 (1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 270.160 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
14-19-11 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-50-20 (1968); OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 711.17 (Page
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 42-102, -106 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981-82); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 11-3-16 (1982); TaX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 974(a) (Vernon 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-5-7 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 58.11.010-.11.050, .12.010 (West 1983);
Wvo. STAT. § 34-117 (1959); and those that provide for government initiated deplatting, e.g.,
CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 66499.11-.20 /2 (West 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 560.221-.229
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may order the vacation of land upon its own motion where the plat
of the subdivision has been recorded for five years and not more
than ten percent of the total area has been sold by lot."'8 The vaca-
tion must be based on a finding that it will promote the public
welfare and conform to the comprehensive plan of the area. 89
Telephone conversations with a number of government officials
around Florida disclosed few examples of the use of such deplat-
ting statutes. A common factual circumstance which appears to ex-
ist when deplatting situations occur is that only a small minority of
lots have been sold out of original ownership. Consequently, when
deplatting occurs, it may produce a few isolated lots surrounded by
larger acreage owned by the original developer.
It may be possible for such deplatting to occur in some portions
of the Charlotte Harbor subdivisions, but significant portions of
these subdivisions have passed out of common ownership into the
hands of scattered individual purchasers. To the extent, however,
that significant acreage remains in the original or a subsequent
landowner's hands, deplatting of those portions can be considered
under existing Florida law absent some limitation arising because
of equitable estoppel or vested rights. Another limitation, of
course, is the physical constraint on deplatting because of the
roads and canals which have been constructed.
Looking to the Florida case law on deplatting provides little
guidance, for deplatting has rarely been litigated.'90
(Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 92.205-.245 (1981); VA. CODE § 15.1-482(b) (1981).
There has not been much activity around the United States dealing with consolidation of
land parcels, and what has been done does not approach the needs in the Charlotte Harbor
area. One example is the California Coastal Conservancy, a state agency created in 1976.
The Conservancy is undertaking three lot consolidation projects-one in southern California
and two in the northern part of the state. In the Santa Monica Mountains, outside Los
Angeles, the Conservancy proposed to acquire and consolidate some 200 small lots for resale
as 16 larger parcels covering a total of about 40 acres. In northern California, one of two
smaller projects provided for consolidation of 72 lots into 50 units under a redesigned build-
ing plan; the other called for the purchase of 35 subdivision lots on 22 acres and subsequent
transfer of their development potential to some other approved area. See R. HEALY & J.
SHORT, THE MARKET FOR RURAL LAND: TRENDS, ISSUES, POLIcIEs 255-58 (1981).
The Oregon statute, in particular, provides a mechanism for the deplatting of undevel-
oped subdivisions in unitary ownership if it is determined that the original platting of the
subdivisions does not conform to contemporary standards. OR. REV. STAT. § 92.205 (1981).
This statute has seen little use to date because of the specific statutory definition of "unde-
veloped." If so much as one road has been built, the land is "developed."
There has been some relevant activity in other nations, and that experience is discussed
infra, at note 226 and accompanying text.
188. FLA. STAT. § 163.280(2) (1981).
189. Id.
190. In Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Worley, 38 So. 618 (Fla. 1905), the Florida Supreme
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Voluntary deplatting appears to be the most feasible approach,
absent amendment to the statutes allowing mandatory deplatting.
Inducements to deplat, however, would be necessary because vol-
untary deplatting and reassembly could trigger the DRI review
process, depending upon the size of the parcel. This would cause
the landowner to incur new and expensive development review
costs.1 9
It may also be possible to induce unitary ownership of certain
tracts of land so that voluntary deplatting would be more feasible.
One idea, for example, is to encourage the land sales companies to
repurchase the land from the lot owners or to swap lots. A major
problem, however, is that many lot owners have been found to be
reluctant to relinquish their property, even when it is economically
advantageous to do so. They perceive a swap not as an escape from
a hopeless situation, but as a device for pirating away their valua-
ble property. Developer contact with the lot owners in itself raises
expectations as to value.192
REASSEMBLY BY GOVERNMENT MANDATED DEPLATTING. As dis-
Court held that where the owners of a tract of land lay out lots and blocks with intervening
streets and parcels of land marked "Park," the owners have manifested an intention to
dedicate such streets and parks to public use and the grantees of such lots and blocks there-
fore acquire the right to have such streets and parks kept open. Id. at 621. This is particu-
larly true with respect to persons owning land which adjoins the particular street or park in
question. Id. at 623. The rationale for this rule is that "[tihese deeds were so drawn as to
induce a large proportion of the purchasers to believe that the premises in controversy were
dedicated, and thus they have received a consideration from the public for this very land."
Id. at 622.
Florida E. Coast Ry. was cited with approval in Weber v. City of Hollywood, 120 So. 2d
826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). In that case, the court held that the filing of a plat is an offer to
dedicate land which may be revoked prior to acceptance by the local government. Id. at 828.
Such a revocation may not take place, however, without the consent of owners of other lots
or blocks in the subdivision if the revocation would reduce the value or beneficial use of
their lots. Id. at 828-29. This rule excludes the closing of public streets as authorized by
statute. Id. at 829.
In Ocean Nay. Co. v. Town of Palm Beach, 152 So. 853 (Fla. 1934), the Florida Supreme
Court considered a case in which the recorded plat did not account for a certain parcel of
the subdivided land. The town argued that it was the intention of the owners to dedicate
the land to public use and that this intention was manifested by their subsequent ac-
quiesence to the public use and town regulation of the land for 17 years. Id. at 856. The
court held that the town had presented sufficient information to overcome the allegations of
insufficient pleadings. Id. at 857.
191. A DRI exemption could be appropriate as an incentive, on the assumption that
future development would be better than the current scheme. This, however, would require
amendment of the statute.
192. One suggested solution is to have a government agency handle all correspondence,
explaining carefully the purchase or swap arrangement. The power of eminent domain, dis-
cussed in text at Section III(D)(3), could also be used by government to induce lot owners to
swap.
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cussed previously, the local governing body may order the vacation
of plats upon its own motion where they have been recorded for
five years and not more than ten percent of the total area has been
sold by lot. The vacation must be based on a finding that it will
promote the public welfare and conform to the comprehensive plan
of the area. 18s Under present law, this appears to be the only situa-
tion where mandatory deplatting is allowed.
If the owners of platted lots purchased those lots for building or
investment and, in so doing, relied upon governmental plat ap-
proval, zoning, and canal and road dedication, the issue of vested
rights or estoppel arises when there is consideration of mandatory
deplatting. This issue has been discussed above and, as applied
here, is a question of fairness.
Under this "fair play" standard, it is still the developer or lot
owner who runs the risk of change. The question faced is when is it
warranted for the property owner to rely on government represen-
tations. A reading of the cases which exist leads toward the conclu-
sion that a developer is warranted in relying upon any affirmative
discretionary act which endorses or approves a particular charac-
ter, location and magnitude of development, but only to the extent
to which there has been disclosure to the decision-making body of
the plans for the use of the land. Therefore, plat approval with
significant site improvements in reliance on the approval could be
used by a developer to challenge a mandatory deplatting.'"
If there is mandatory deplatting where the lots are still in uni-
tary ownership, then the expectation of a specific pattern of lots
for sale would be frustrated, but there would still be no denial of
all use-just one use-and it is probable that reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations could still be realized. The taking chal-
lenge discussed earlier in the rezoning context is relevant here. 9"
DEPLATTING INDUCED BY TAX ABATEMENT. A clearly stated pro-
193. FLA. STAT. § 163.280(2) (1981).
194. Road and canal improvements, for example, would probably be considered as reli-
ance sufficiently detrimental to give rise to vested rights. In Town of Largo v. Imperial
Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), the developer spent $379,000 on land
acquisition and project design after the property was rezoned and after extensive negotia-
tion with city officials. The detrimental reliance was composed of land acquisition costs,
architectural fees, interest, taxes, sewer permits and other costs. Id.
If lands have been simply platted by a developer and no substantial expenditures have
been made in good faith reliance on the plate, then the ability of the local government to
mandatorily deplat is enhanced. Thus, if there were an amendment to FLA. STAT. ch. 177 to
allow additional instances for mandatory deplatting, the estoppel argument probably could
not be raised in that situation.
195. See discussion in text at Section III(B)(1), Rezoning to Lower Density.
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gram of tax abatement is one method to induce deplatting. If a
landowner is willing to deplat to a single parcel, the property tax
assessment might abate to reflect the land as deplatted.198 How-
ever, in communities containing platted subdivisions the subdi-
vided lots provide a source of property tax revenue with little im-
mediate burden. To the extent that the parcels in combined form
would be entitled to lower levels of taxation, these communities
will face a revenue loss.
DEPLATTING INDUCED BY CLUSTER ZONING. A cluster development
ordinance allows a landowner to seek permission to shift the loca-
tion of units allowed on the site to best meet site planning consid-
erations and market demand for a type of unit other than large-lot,
single-family housing. If a cluster option existed for areas of the
platted subdivisions, it would allow one holding title to a large
tract to replat and to then design a subdivision placing the allowed
density on the most suitable areas of the parcel. Also, the ability to
cluster may attract private assembly actions to take advantage of
the option.
For example, the owner of a one-hundred acre parcel, platted in
two acre parcels, could replat and be offered the option to cluster
the allowed fifty units on perhaps thirty acres, leaving seventy
acres of open space. The permission to cluster could also be tied to
provisions allowing a change from detached single-family use to
multi-family attached dwellings, adding a density bonus to further
lower infrastructure costs per unit.
DEPLATTING INDUCED BY PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT. The
Planned Unit Development (PUD) concept is one step beyond
clustering. It provides flexibility in site design which allows not
only clustering but also mixtures of housing types and ancillary
commercial development. PUD requirements are usually included
in the zoning ordinance and are administered by either a district-
ing approach or through a special permit process.
The districting approach to PUD would be the method most ap-
plicable to platted subdivisions. This approach has two variants.
First is the floating zone method where the zoning ordinance enu-
merates the PUD requirements, but the PUD zones are not
mapped until after application and approval. The second method
196. That in turn raises interesting and difficult questions of tax assessment and valua-
tion. Is a site which has been voluntarily deplatted taxable to the same degree as before?
One can argue that having been deplatted, the site is no longer available for multiple lot
development. On the other hand, one can argue that the site is now available for new devel-
opment, and the tax on it should reflect its new capability.
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of PUD districting is by use of overlay zones-districts which are
both mapped and included in the ordinance text. Overlay PUD
zones result in a mandatory set of requirements, and have been
used in instances where site characteristics demand clustering of
structures on only part of the site.
If areas of the platted lands were designated as possible PUD
districts for floating zone use, and if the sites were in single owner-
ship, application could be made for PUD approval. If ownership is
split, a joint venture or private assembly effort would be necessary
and this concept is discussed below.
If areas of platted lands were designated as overlay PUD zones,
this designation is in effect a rezoning of the land, and the relevant
issues are discussed in Section III(B)(1), under "Rezoning to
Lower Density." The designation of an overlay zone places the
property simultaneously in two zones-the underlying zoning dis-
trict and the overlay zone. Requirements of both zones have to be
met for project approval. 9
DEPLATTING INDUCED BY TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS.
The use of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) differs from
clustering or PUD in that it is based upon the concept that density
can be transferred even if the property of another is between the
sending and receiving areas. Collier County and Palm Beach
County have TDR provisions in their zoning ordinances, but
neither was specifically designed to address the platted lands prob-
lem. ' Sarasota County recently enacted a TDR ordinance, al-
lowing density in platted, but undeveloped, subdivisions to be
transferred to the urban core. 99 TDR is "clustering" on a larger
scale, and it has been referred to in the professional literature as a
tool to assist in resolving a portion of the platted lands problem.e
197. Several Florida cases have reviewed PUDs. E.g., Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches,
366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979); Fogg v. Broward County, 397 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981);
Dade County v. Beauchamp, 348 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Andover Dev. Corp. v. City
of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Ralston, 284 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). No Florida courts, however, have discussed the
seminal question of whether PUDs are valid in Florida absent specific enabling legislation.
In one case, however, the court noted in dicta that a landowner challenging zoning as too
restrictive failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he had not applied for a
PUD, which "would allow a proper degree of negotiation for the protection of interests of
the general public consistent with the recognition of the constitutional rights of tile land-
owners." Ralston, 284 So. 2d at 459.
198. See Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28 (1981); Collier County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 78-71 (1978).
199. Sarasota County, Fla., Ordinance 82-61 (1982).
200. Additional discussion of the TDR concept appears in text at Section IH(D)(2),
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2. Reassembly of Lots in Scattered Ownership by Deplatting
REASSEMBLY BY GOVERNMENT MANDATED DEPLATTING. Deplatting
land with multiple owners would probably require revision in the
enabling authority. If a large subdivision with separately owned
lots was deplatted, the question is what would the lot purchasers
own. It is important to recognize that bulk acreage is conveyed by
a metes and bounds legal description, whereas subdivided lots are
sold by lot and block number in relation to the recorded plat. If
the plat is vacated, the lot owner's deed describes a parcel which
may be difficult to trace, unless it can be located with a physical
survey from monuments on the subdivision boundary. If impossi-
ble to trace, deplatting might produce property owners who were,
in effect, tenants in common of one large parcel. Each would own a
partial undivided interest in the whole parcel with joint access, but
each would also have all the management problems that such a
situation implies. 01 Either way, the individual lot owner's ability
to make some reasonable use of the property is uncertain. A seri-
ous consideration, therefore, is whether deplatting alone would ac-
complish anything beneficial. The uncertainty of the resulting
property interests and the potential for confusion are arguments
against using deplatting in isolation, at least without new clarifying
legislation."' 2
THE FACTUAL PREDICATE FOR MANDATORY DEPLATTING. A gov-
erning body may adopt a resolution vacating plats only upon appli-
cation of the owners in fee simple of the land covered by the plat,
and then only after it has been determined that such vacation will
not affect the right of convenient access of persons who own land
nearby.203 Local governments have no present authority under this
statute to vacate plats upon their own motion without an applica-
tion from owners of lots within the subdivision.204
As discussed earlier, local governments may vacate plats on their
own when plats have been recorded for at least five years and
under the subheading REASSEMBLY INDUCED BY TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS. Sara-
sota County's TDR ordinance, having been recently enacted, has not yet been applied.
201. This possibility poses a significant administrative challenge, unless some equivalent
of a homeowners association could be created simultaneously to serve as nominal owner of
the land, much as homeowners associations now serve as a vehicle to "own" and maintain
common areas in subdivided developments throughout the country.
202. For a deplatting variation with a potential resolution of these issues, however, see
the discussion in text at Section III(D)(2), under the subheading REASSEMBLY BY LOT
POOLING.
203. FLA. STAT. § 177.101(3) (1981).
204. 1972 FLA ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 169.
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where not more than ten percent of the total subdivision area in
which the plats are located has been sold as lots by the subdi-
vider.2 0 5 As a prerequisite to such mandatory deplatting and rever-
sion to acreage, local government must find that the vacation of
the subdivided land will promote the public health, safety, order,
economy, and welfare; that the vacation conforms to the compre-
hensive plan of the area; and that there is due notice and a public
hearing concerning the vacation.206
There is a substantial estoppel argument against mandatory
deplatting. Unlike a zoning change, a deplatting may deprive the
lot owner of the essence of his purchase-a distinct lot whose exis-
tence is in part traceable to a governmental act and whose acquisi-
tion, rather than use, was accompanied by a financial detriment.
Thus, even if the enabling legislation was amended to allow such
deplatting, courts are likely to protect innocent lot purchasers
from such action unless demonstrably necessary. As one Florida
court has said in another context, but with implications here:
Lest our decision be misconstrued, we recognize an increasing
awareness on the part of local governments of the growth
problems which vitally affect many of the communities in Florida.
Therefore, nothing in this opinion should be construed as any im-
pediment to the efforts of municipalities and other local govern-
mental entities which exercise zoning authority from reducing the
density provisions in their zoning regulations in an orderly and
comprehensive manner, provided this is accomplished in the in-
terest of the public health, safety and welfare and in a way as not
to mislead innocent parties who in good faith rely to their detri-
ment upon the acts of their governing bodies.207
Unlike the vested rights or estoppel challenge to rezoning, a
challenge by a lot owner to deplatting is much more likely to pre-
vail, though direct authority for this proposition is slim. The same
substantial public purpose considerations that might lead a court
to permit a rezoning of individual lots might, however, lead a court
to permit a deplatting despite the vested right or estoppel argu-
205. FLA. STAT. § 163.280(2) (1981).
206. Id. The factual predicate for vacation of plats under existing legislation is such that
deplatting does not appear to be a viable mechanism to alleviate possible platted lands
problems. It would be very expensive and difficult to contact all of the owners of the subdi-
vided lots and ask them to apply for vacations of their respective lots. Also, the large subdi-
visions do not meet the requirements for vacation upon motion of the governmental body.
207. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
1983]
574 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:505
ment. The question then arises as to whether the property has
been "taken" by deplatting.
It has already been noted that courts have suggested a variety of
tests or factors to be used in determining whether a governmental
act constitutes a taking.20 8 To date, the United States Supreme
Court has not adopted a definitive test, but makes "essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries. "209 Nonetheless, the Court has identified cer-
tain factors of particular significance in determining whether a tak-
ing has occurred, including those relating to the character of the
governmental action and its impact on property owners. As dis-
cussed earlier, Florida courts have adopted this approach.21
The case law is not definitive as to whether the property owners
in the platted subdivisions have any reasonable investment-backed
expectation which would be frustrated by deplatting. Different
owners may have different expectations regarding their parcels and
not all may be reasonable. The effect of the approval of the plats
by the county commission is important, but the mere fact that the
landowner had assumed the land was available for development in
a certain manner is not conclusive as to whether a taking has
occurred. 1 '
The taking question in deplatting is therefore difficult to resolve.
If it were to be statutorily permitted, however, the case law which
exists suggests that if deplatting is based upon substantial public
health and welfare concerns, and the existence of the plat itself
creates a public harm, then there could be a determination that
the deplatting action is a reasonable governmental action and not a
taking. In the alternative, if it were found that after deplatting
there remained a reasonable use of a lot owner's land, then the
deplatting might also be upheld against a taking challenge.
REASSEMBLY INDUCED BY TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS. A
TDR program would allow a landowner to increase site density by
purchasing density units from other lot owners and transferring
the density to his site. The sending parcel would then be deed-
restricted against future development.
The application is obvious and could work well with lots in scat-
tered ownership. Areas of the subdivision which could be allowed
208. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
209. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
211. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130 (argument that taking may be estab-
lished by demonstrating an inability to exploit a property interest which one assumed was
available for development is untenable).
PLATTED LANDS
to develop at a higher density, and to which local government is
willing to make the public service and facilities commitment neces-
sary to mitigate any adverse impact of increased density, would be
areas where density could be increased by purchase of develop-
ment rights from areas designated as sending areas (areas not de-
sirable for build-out). As long as the planning studies designating
the sending and receiving zones showed a rational nexus between
the two sites, this would be viewed as similar to a community-wide
cluster program, with overall density remaining relatively constant.
The TDR approach may be especially helpful as a vehicle to
match new developers of specific sites with unhappy lot owners
from other areas."2
The use of TDR is a judicially-recognized land management tool.
The United States Supreme Court examined the use of TDR in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"13 and, agree-
ing with New York's highest court,1 found that "[w]hile these
rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'tak-
ing' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and,
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
impact of regulation. '" 1 5
The New York Court of Appeals has also addressed the use of
TDR in the decision Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York.2" As opposed to its later Penn Central decision, the court
212. The problem which arises, however, is how to treat the deed restricted parcels.
They are privately owned, yet no development use can be made of them.
213. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
214. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).
215. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. The Court examined New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law, and the allegations by Penn Central that their property had
been "taken" without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments and that they were arbitrarily deprived of their property without due process of law
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 119. Penn Central had sought to construct
a fifty-five story office tower on top of the terminal and was denied approval because of the
terminal's landmark status. Id. at 116-18.
The Landmarks Preservation Law, as applied to the terminal, allowed tranference of the
development rights to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the terminal. Id. at 113-15.
Additionally, and an important factor in the Court's ultimate decision, the law permitted
the remainder of the parcel to be used in a gainful fashion. "The restrictions imposed are
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to en-
hance not only the [tierminal site proper but also other properties." Id. at 138. Simply, the
terminal remained in the ownership of Penn Central, and its presently beneficial use as such
was allowed.
216. 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976).
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held that an attempt by the city to designate two privately-owned
parks as passive recreation areas was invalid, prohibiting their de-
velopment but allowing transfer of the development rights.2 7 The
court stated that "while there was a significant diminution in the
value of the property, there was no actual appropriation or taking
of the parks by title or governmental occupation."2 18 The court
found no right to compensation as it would for a taking by eminent
domain, and went on to examine whether such a restriction was a
valid exercise of the police power.2' 1 In holding that the regulation
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, the court found
that it deprived the owner of practically all of his property rights
and, though this may have been offset by the transferable develop-
ment rights, the market considerations and governmental discre-
tionary decisions which were a pre-condition to the use of these
rights resulted in too great an uncertainty as to their possible
use.2 0 There was no right to implement these development rights,
but only a series of discretionary reviews to determine where they
could be used.
It is enough to say that the loose-ended transferable development
rights in this case fall short of achieving a fair allocation of eco-
nomic burden. Even though the development rights have not
been nullified, their severance has rendered their value so uncer-
tain and contingent, as to deprive the property owner of their
practical usefulness, except under rare and perhaps coincidental
circumstances.2 21
In Penn Central, the income-productive terminal remained and
there were specific sites owned by Penn Central to which the de-
velopment rights could be transferred. In Fred F. French, there
were private parks which remained private parks-but were re-
quired to be maintained at the owner's expense as parks open to
the public. Additionally, the transfer procedure in Fred F. French
involved a great deal of government discretion.
In Penn Central, the New York court, affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court, found permissible the preservation of the
terminal, after having found the prohibition of development on the
private parks impermissible in Fred F. French.
217. Id. at 383.
218. Id. at 386.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 387-88.
221. Id. at 389.
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The ultimate evil of a deprivation of property, or better, a frus-
tration of property rights, under the guise of an exercise of the
police power is that it forces the owner to assume the cost of pro-
viding a benefit to the public without recoupment. There is no
attempt to share the cost of the benefit among those benefited,
that is, society at large. 2 s2
In Fred F. French, the city was attempting to use TDR to pro-
vide parkland open to the public, yet was both unwilling to pay for
it or to designate transfer sites for the development rights that
could be used as a matter of right. This was too great a private
burden for a public benefit.2 '
TDR is an equitable means of providing an anticipated return
on land investment to property owners whose return otherwise
might be lessened by regulatory activity. Professor John J. Cos-
tonis, considered by many to be the innovator in the TDR area,
has stated that "TDR compensates owners for restrictions on the
development of their land, not with dollars, but with the entitle-
ment to transfer their unused development rights to parcels else-
where. ' 2 4 However, as illustrated above, the opportunity for an
equitable return must be provided. TDR is a means to meet both
the needs of the public in the protection of a recognized resource
and the needs of the property owner to make an equitable return
on investment.225
222. Id. at 387.
223. In reflecting upon these two decisions, their author, Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel
of the New York State Court of Appeals, in response to commentators' attempts to place
the decisions in the "eminent domain box" or the "police power box," has stated:
So with TDRs, for the time being at least, I think the fruitful approach is to try
not to worry about which box it falls into. The problem is to analyze the situation
economically to see what the impact is, what it is we are doing, why we are doing
it, and whether it fits in with the basic, trend of government and law and social
policy in permitting our society to survive, both with its amenities and its eco-
nomic necessities. Then, later, we will see whether it fits in one place or the other.
Breitel, A Judicial View of Transferable Development Rights, LAND Usa L. & ZONING DIG.
No. 2, 1978, at 5, 7.
224. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1055-56 (1975).
225. It is not a means to provide the public a benefit with an unreasonable burden upon
the landowner, who, in the words of Chief Judge Breitel, should not find that "the accident
of ownership determines who shall bear the cost initially." Fred F. French, 350 N.E.2d at
387. Judge Breitel went on to state:
Of course, as a further consequence, the ultimate economic cost of providing the
benefit is hidden from those who in a democratic society are given the power of
deciding whether or not they wish to obtain the benefit despite the ultimate eco-
nomic cost, however initially distributed .... In other words, the removal from
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REASSEMBLY BY LOT POOLING. Between individual ownership and
public ownership is the concept of pooled ownership. This concept
can be illustrated by the enclosure movement in 18th century Brit-
ain. In an attempt to strengthen the institution of private property
and to enclose common lands, various Acts of Parliament were
passed. The landholders involved pooled their lands and the com-
mon rights attaching to them. This was done in order to be able to
redistribute and reallocate the land, and was an important part of
the process of changing over from the feudal system to freehold
ownership of land. What resulted was a change from ownership of
a small parcel, with use rights to a large area of common land, to
ownership of a larger parcel which included a portion of the previ-
ous common land.
A more recent example of the use of this concept is the standard
method used in the reconstruction of war-damaged towns in
France after World War II. In LeHavre, for example, land owner-
ship patterns would not allow any sensible scheme of redevelop-
ment. Also, a limited rearrangement based on existing ownership
would have been inadequate. A completely different layout was
proposed, and a form of co-ownership was established. This was
not a simple redistribution of lots, for property owners surrendered
their former holding of land in return for shares in an "ilot," or
block.2"
productive use of private property has an ultimate social cost more easily con-
cealed by imposing the cost on the owner alone. When successfully concealed, the
public is not likely to have any objection to the "cost-free" benefit.
Id. at 387 (citations ommitted).
226. In LeHavre, all landowners in the block became members of the group co-owning
the land, the building or buildings, and the common-use facilities. The public authorities
paid for the new buildings for former owners as compensation for their war losses. Each
owner, however, would own outright the space actually used by him. This type of reas-
sembly did away with any need for government purchase and redistribution of the land. It
was simply redistributed to the co-owners as shares in the block.
A similar procedure is used in present day France for urban renewal. The Ministry of
Construction, which has jurisdiction over planning, works with the municipality in the plan-
ning process, and the municipality is responsible for implementation. The municipality may
either undertake the task itself, or more likely, it will delegate it to a "mixed" company, one
combining both public and private investment, but weighted on the public side. The com-
pany which is established for a given area proposes to the individual landowners that they
take part in the renewal operation. If the owners accept, they will receive no compensation
for turning over their property to the company, but they will have a right to possession of
space in the new or reconstructed buildings. The owners who do not agree to participate on
this cooperative basis are bought out either by compulsion or by agreement.
In tracing the beginnings of the pooling concept, N. Lichfield and H. Darin-Drabkin state
that:
This system of private landowner/public authority co-operation is widely used
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A pooling arrangement is not foreign to the United States. It is
in West Germany under its Federal Building Law, dating back to the Lex Adickes
of 1909, which established the legal right for the authorities to enforce a compul-
sory exchange of property.
The planning authority is responsible for the detailed site plan which contains
the new street pattern, additional open spaces, and so on (the Bebauugsplan).
Usually this lowers the total amount of land left in private ownership; for exam-
ple, in Dortmund the redirection was of the order of 28 per cent. However, before
this binding site plan is published, the authority attempts to reach agreement
with the holders of proprietary interests voluntarily as the rearrangement of plots
that is necessitated by the new plan and exemptions from rates and costs are
made in the event of a voluntary agreement. The revised landownership plan
(Umlegungskarte) thus fairly apportions the remaining plots among the
landowners.
It should be noted that if the new plot is decreased in value, the owner receives
compensation (either cash or other land); however, if there is a gain in value, bet-
terment is charged, since this is the result purely of public activity with no action
on the part of the landowners.
The German system has been copied in other countries, particularly in Japan.
Since 1919 land-readjustment schemes have been widely used, particularly after
natural disasters or war destruction. Approximately 27 per cent of the total urban
land surface, or over 1,500 square kilometres, has been affected. Again, both pub-
lic and private bodies are involved. In the latter case these are known as Land
Readjustment Associations and they must hold a yearly public meeting (sokai) of
all landowners to approve the scheme for rearrangement. The basic procedure is
the same in the area as a whole; some land is designated for public uses (called
genbu), while the remainder is pooled as the reserve to be apportioned between all
the landowners (horyuchi). This procedure was used, for example, when the high-
speed train line was built from Tokyo.
N. LICHFIELD & H. DARIN-DRABKIN, LAND POLICY IN PLANNING 197-98 (1980).
Britain has also considered the concept of co-ownership. The Uthwatt Committee in 1942
considered it as a means of evening out the problem of compensation and betterment over
entire urban areas-a problem referred to as "windfalls and wipeouts" in the United States.
Ultimately the Committee rejected the idea because the focus of their work was to secure
for the community the increments of value in land due the community, and pooling of own-
ership would still result in the increased value remaining in private hands.
British author D. Guthrie has addressed the concept of pooled ownership. He suggests
that "Itlo nationalize land would provoke anger, to municipalize land would produce suspi-
cion, but the voluntary amalgamation of ownerships, with an appropriate return as interest,
might well make the position more acceptable." Guthrie, Land Rationalization, 46 J. TOWN
PLAN. INST. 301, 302 (1960).
Guthrie suggested that an entire community form a company through which all land
transactions would pass. The company would hold all land, leasing it to the former owners
and others, and distributing to the shareholders (the former owners) interest in proportion
to their previous land holdings. Such companies would be non-governmental, but govern-
ment would participate as a shareholder to represent citizens without shares, even though
government may not have owned land. Id. at 302-03.
In the Charlotte Harbor area, portions of the platted lands could be designated for rede-
velopment by a "mixed" company. Share certificates in the company would replace the ti-
tles held by existing landowners and the number of shares would be based upon a careful,
realistic valuation of the land.
The lot pooling concept is examined in greater detail in W. DOEBELE, LAND READJUSTMENT
(1982). The volume examines programs in Germany, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Australia,
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presently used for the controlled development of oil and gas, with
an element of compulsion from states using their police power. In
Texas, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Florida, for example, landowners
over a particular oil or gas reserve may be required by the state to
join a pool, and their share in the risks and profits will be in rela-
tion to the surveyed estimate of reserves beneath their property."'1
In Florida this procedure is outlined in chapter 377, Florida
Statutes.22 The Florida policy of pooling different owners' inter-
ests is "to provide for the protection and adjustment of the correl-
ative rights of the owners of the land wherein said natural re-
sources lie and the owners and producers of oil and gas resources
and the products made therefrom." '229
There is presently no Florida case law that has reviewed chapter
377. This is probably due to both the small amount of oil and gas
reserves in Florida as compared to the fields of Texas and
Oklahoma, and the authority given to the Department of Natural
Resources to encourage unitization and conservation of oil and gas
drilling in Florida.30
State enabling legislation would probably be required to use the
pooling concept for the platted lands. Such legislation, even if not
and should be a basic reader for those interested in a detailed discussion of how lot pooling
has actually worked. This is the first book-length publication on land readjustment printed
in the English language.
227. See generally R. HEMINGWAY & B. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS REPORTER (1982) (multi-
volume treatise including detailed discussion of oil and gas pooling).
228. FLA. STAT. §§ 377.01-.712 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (amended 1983). For the purposes of
this article, unitization and pooling relating to oil development are treated similarly.
229. FLA. STAT. § 377.06 (1981).
The Department of Natural Resources is the regulating agency of this pooling process. As
such, the Department is directed to determine, after a hearing(s), the proper number and
location of wells so as to prevent "waste and to avoid the augmenting and accumulation of
risks arising from the drilling of an excessive number of wells." FLA. STAT. § 377.25(2) (1981)
(emphasis added). The Department may require the different landowners to develop the site
jointly, and owners are also encouraged to merge their interests voluntarily for oil and gas
development by the Department granting to them an exemption from any state statutes
relating to trusts, monopolies or contracts in restraint of trade. FLA. STAT. §§ 377.27, .29
(1981).
Hearings are required in front of the Department when any pool or reserve area is estab-
lished. The Department is authorized to establish the pool and to determine the method of
allocation of respective royalties and costs to owners of the separate parcels on a fair and
equitable basis. FLA. STAT. § 377.28 (1981). However, the order requiring operation of the
pool is not effective until at least 75% of the parties involved (landowners and operators)
have executed an agreement. Id. § 377.28(4).
230. For a more thorough discussion of unitization and pooling in Florida, see Carmi-
chael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 35, 77-99 (1974); and Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in
the Energy Crisis?, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196 (1974).
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required, would be desirable to standardize the terms of reference
and articles of association." 1 Pooling could in effect be used like a
limited partnership, where the lot owners contribute their land and
the general partners (the developers) arrange financing and man-
age the development activity. Return to the limited partners could
be based upon a percentage of property provided. This is quite an
231. These "land corporations" could simply administer the land, as opposed to develop-
ing it or planning for its development. Planning and zoning powers could remain with local
government.
Under one possible version, a corporation could be established under a state "landowners
compulsory pooling act." The legislation would require registration of the corporation
within a specified time period. The next step would be the preparation of an estimate of the
value of all land under the corporation's jurisdiction for its full permissible development.
Shares in the corporation to the amount of the total value would then be issued to individ-
ual owners on a pro rats basis. The initial asset, then, would be the total combined value of
the land.
Development approval could be handled in two ways. First, all review and approval could
be carried out in the traditional manner once the corporation agreed to sell a parcel for
development. As an alternative, a condition precedent to municipal submission could be the
corporation's approval of the development plans either before or after the agreement to sell.
In the latter instance, any owner, developer or builder would have to submit proposals to
the board of directors before seeking government approval. The board and its consultants
would then review the proposed project to determine whether it would add to or detract
from the total asset. The determining factors for approval would include the fact that the
proposed project would create maximum benefit to the total asset rather than to any partic-
ular parcel. If approved, submission to governmental agencies is made. If denied, the propo-
sal could not be so reviewed, and since the corporation "owns" the land, there is no question
of a taking.
Yet, the concept is not without its problems. The first question to be asked is whether in
a democratic society this is the type of solution to use. These "company towns" would be
run by a class of ex-landowners, and it is only they who will have the vote. Would this be a
throwback to the concept of ownership of land being an essential element of full citizen-
ship? This immediately cautions one to be concerned about the size of the land controlled
by each corporation and concerned about the implications of the possible merger of such
corporations.
One of the immediate benefits of lot pooling would be in the administration of property
tax. It is the corporation which will be billed, not the individual owners, and it is also the
corporation that will pay the capital gains tax.
Safeguards could be put into the system to assure that the corporation either sells the
deplatted acreage or sells land when development approval is received. For example, it could
be stipulated that if title to a parcel was not transferred when a purchaser wanted it, title
must be transferred when all approvals from the governmental authority were received and
financing committed. Over time, as the asset redeveloped, it would be sold. Once this piece-
meal sale was complete, the corporation could be liquidated, and the net result would be
deplatting, replatting, and development of the selected portions of the subdivision.
The pooled land situation is most likely to succeed when the land pooled has development
value in a combined form. First, the corporation needs sales to generate cash. Second, the
rights received will need to have some value to be attractive.
Given this discussion, land pooling may prove to be a possible tool in certain areas of the
subdivisions to overcome the obstacle to better development posed by the pattern of ex-
isting platted lands.
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innovative concept and is one that deserves further examination as
a possible solution to identified platted lands problems.2 2
3. Reassembly by Eminent Domain
At the other end of the spectrum from regulatory reassembly lies
the process of land reassembly through eminent domain. As dis-
cussed earlier, the regulatory power of government is not unlim-
ited, and there may not be, in some cases, "a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." ' But paying for the
232. The adoption of land pooling will require the state government to undertake a
number of steps to authorize, guide and assist local government (and other designated au-
thorities) to undertake pooling projects. These steps include:
1. Legislation:
Amendment to existing land use planning legislation to authorize and regulate the prepa-
ration and implementation of a pooling program by local governments and other designated
authorities. The legislation would stipulate that a pooling program be prepared to define
and regulate each pooling project. The legislation would provide for the use of the resump-
tion technique of acquiring and consolidating separate landholdings along with public and
government lands in the areas designated for pooling.
2. Regulations:
Preparation of regulations to guide local government and other designated authorities in
the preparation and implementation of pooling programs and projects.
3. Standard Procedure:
Formulation of a standard procedure for the commencement, preparation, exhibition, re-
view, adoption, approval, financing, implementation, finalization and reporting of pooling
programs and projects, with provision for consultation with landowners at project com-
mencement and during project preparation.
4. Principles, Criteria and Formulas:
Formulation of the principles, criteria and formulas to be followed in determining project
boundaries, assessing project costs, assessing project profits, allocating the new sites, sharing
project profits, etc.
5. Model Program Text:
Preparation of a standard draft text for pooling programs to define, authorize and regu-
late each pooling project and as a de facto partnership agreement between the local govern-
ment and the landowners.
6. Eminent Domain:
Willingness of the relevant government agency to issue condemnation notices for the con-
solidation of all lands under an approved and published pooling scheme.
7. State Government Administration:
Formation of a group in the state government planning agency to assist the local govern-
ment in reviewing and approving draft pooling programs, and to then oversee, monitor and
report the implementation of pooling projects.
8. Project Advice and Assistance:
Provision of advice and assistance to local governments in preparing and implementing
pooling programs by a state agency.
Possible establishment of a fund to provide short term loans to local government for
working capital for pooling projects.
This material is abstracted from Archer, Land Pooling by Local Government for Planned
Urban Development in Perth, 1980 AUsTL. INST. URB. STUD., MONOGRAPH 4, at 65-66.
233. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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change, however, may involve the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, and it too is not unlimited. The language of the fifth
amendment is instructive: "[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation. 2 84
Thus private property may not be taken unless for a "public
use" and only upon payment of "just compensation." The follow-
ing discussion examines what these concepts may mean in the plat-
ted lands context, but a few introductory comments are first in
order.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is different from
purchasing land in the private market. Land is customarily ac-
quired on the open market by making the current owner a desira-
ble offer; government often acquires land in this manner. The
power of eminent domain exists to compel a sale at a "fair" price,
and is used where the landowner refuses to sell or is in a monopoly
position and asking an "unjust" price. An example of the use of
eminent domain occurs in land assembly for urban renewal. One
key landowner could refuse to sell and bar assembly of sufficient
land to complete a planned project unless government exercises its
eminent domain authority. In the urban renewal situation, the tak-
ing of some parcels whose current use is not "blighted" has been
allowed if the parcel is necessary to complete a large project.28 5
The use of the condemned property must be "public." Courts
have been willing to uphold eminent domain where the end use
was not itself public (like a school or courthouse) but the taking
served an ostensibly public purpose even though the land ended up
in private hands. There is no power, however, to compel one pri-
234. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Florida Constitution contains a similar provision: "No
private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation
therefore paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available
to the owner." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
235. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act, which attacked the problem of urban blight on an area-wide rather than a struc-
ture-by-structure basis, was not an unconstitutional exercise of authority against a land-
owner whose building did not currently contribute to blight).
The literature in the planning and law fields does not deal with the platted lands issues as
they are being addressed here. Some do, however, comment on the problems of reassembly
of small parcels by government action.
Once rural parcels are divided, sold to diverse owners, and peppered with inter-
spersed residential uses, they can be very difficult and expensive to recombine.
Some indications of the cost and complexities of parcel recombination were evi-
dent in the experience of urban-renewal agencies during the 1950s and 1960s. The
agencies incurred massive expenses as they purchased small, central-city proper-
ties and tried to recombine them into the large parcels needed for various projects.
R. HEALv & J. SHORT, supra note 187, at 212.
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vate property owner to sell land for the benefit of another private
party. Whether that power should be available by asking govern-
ment to act as middleman is the issue. In short, when a taking
appears to be for a private use, it may be turned aside. Under cur-
rent law, nonetheless, governing bodies in many jurisdictions are
permitted to use the power of eminent domain to accomplish a
wide range of objectives deemed to constitute public purposes. s6
The use of eminent domain in the platted subdivisions would
clear the current confusion of separate ownership by creating a sin-
gle ownership-the government purchasing body-which could in
turn convey some or all of the bulk acreage to private enterprises
for redevelopment in conformance with comprehensive plan and
zoning amendments. The eminent domain alternative has a degree
of simplicity to it that is attractive, but the authority to exercise
the power is limited to specific situations and levels of government,
and the exercise of the power must serve a public purpose. A con-
sideration which effects the practicality of the use of eminent do-
main is the existence of sufficient public funds to pay the "just
compensation" required for acquisition of private property.2 3 7
236. For example, in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982), the
California Supreme Court held that the City of Oakland's attempt to take and operate the
Oakland Raiders football franchise may constitute a proper public use and remanded the
case for a trial on the merits. The court found that the operation of a sports franchise might
be a proper municipal function, and that a prompt retransfer of the franchise would neces-
sarily vitiate the "public use" which is a prerequisite to condemnation. Id. at 843.
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), the
Supreme Court of Michigan considered whether the city's condemnation of property in or-
der to convey it to a private corporation encompassed a sufficient public purpose as to con-
stitute a constitutionally permissible eminent domain action. The condemnation occurred
pursuant to a statute which authorized actions in order to revitalize the economy. The court
held that because the public benefit to be derived from the condemnation was "clear and
significant," essential public purposes were served, and the action was constitutional. Id. at
459. See also Warner, Ehrmann, Jackson & Lax, Detroit's Renaissance Includes Factories,
41 URB. LAND 3 (1982) (detailed discussion of urban renewal plan and other aspects involved
in Poletown case).
237. If eminent domain were undertaken, several ways of financing it might be consid-
ered. The first is through resale of the bulk acreage. It may turn out that some bulk acreage,
subject to comprehensive plan and zoning changes, is quite valuable, allowing the govern-
ment to recoup a significant portion of its eminent domain cost. This financing method is, of
course, appropriate only for acreage which is to be committed to development, and not for
open space preservation or restoration. Furthermore, for this financing device to be feasible,
the land must have value in a reassembled configuration and there must be a market for
resale. The parameters of these two variables would have to be fully explored.
A second major financing vehicle is through government funding of acquisition of ecologi-
cally important areas, an appropriate method of financing for lands which should not be
developed. There may be a problem, however, in acquiring any state funding for what may
well be regarded as a "local" problem.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES A PROPER PUBLIC PURPOSE. While private
property cannot constitutionally be taken except for a "public
use," this term is incapable of precise definition.23 8 However, the
two views generally recognized are: (1) that "public use" means ac-
tual use by the general population (the "narrow view")"3 9 and (2)
that "public use" means public advantage or benefit (the "broad
view").2 40 The first view has generally been held to be too restric-
tive, and therefore the trend is away from the narrow "public use"
view and towards the broader "public purpose" view.2 41
The power of eminent domain is inherent to the State of Florida,
as it is to all states, and the state may delegate that power by stat-
ute to its political subdivisions. The state has delegated the power
of eminent domain to the counties, 42 and to municipalities,2 43 as
well as to certain specialized districts and agencies for specific pur-
poses.2 4 Florida also has general statutes detailing the proper pro-
cedure for the exercise of the power by the state, its municipalities
A third method is some special financing mechanism linked to the lot sale process itself,
such as a transfer tax. Also, perhaps the owners of lots currently developed could be treated
as beneficiaries of a restriction on new developments nearby, and specially assessed for the
cost of eminent domain acquisitions. One problem with special assessments, however, may
be that some of the benefit is likely to be "general," meaning that the full cost could not be
recaptured by a betterment assessment, requiring some subsidy from general tax revenues.
238. 2A C. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (J. Sackman & P. Rohan rev. 3d ed. 1981).
239. Id. at § 7.2[1].
240. Id. at § 7.2[2].
241. Courts and commentators alike generally refer to this requirement as the necessity
for a "public purpose" to justify the taking. Due to the imprecise definition of the require-
ment, the issue of whether a public purpose exists is essentially a case-by-case determina-
tion, influenced more by settled practices and social necessities of the people of the state in
which the question arises than philological considerations. 1 C. NICHOLS, supra note 238, §
40. One general proposition is that the public use may be negative in nature, such as preven-
tion of an evil. 2A C. NICHOLS, supra note 238, § 7.2[2]. This is part of the reasoning behind
the constitutionality of the use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment purposes. Also,
there is a general judicial recognition that a strong presumption of validity exists for the
legislative determination that a certain taking is for a public purpose. Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Note, Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 897, 956, 957 (1972). Several commentators have suggested that the public
use requirement in reality does not impose a consistent substantive limitation on the power
of eminent domain. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
11 ErVTL. L. 1, 41-42 (1980); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:
An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 614 (1949). However, courts continue to discuss it
and occasionally cite it as grounds for declaring the exercise of eminent domain unconstitu-
tional. Thus, justifying the taking as a proper public purpose still deserves attention.
242. FLA. STAT. § 127.01 (1981).
243. FLA. STAT. § 180.22 (1981).
244. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 375.031(6) (1981) (Department of Natural Resources); FLA. STAT.
§ 421.08(4) (1981) (iousing authorities); FLA. STAT. §§ 373.086, .139 (1981 & Supp. 1982)
(water management districts).
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and any other public authorities."4
Florida cases have established some broad guidelines regarding
the public purpose requirement. Cases determining whether a pro-
ject serves a public purpose so as to allow the expenditure of pub-
lic funds and the sale of bonds are instructive because the stan-
dard is the same as that for eminent domain cases."" A legislative
determination that a particular use of the power of eminent do-
main serves a public purpose is presumed valid and should be up-
held absent a finding that it is arbitrary or clearly erroneous.2 47 It
is also well established that a public authority may not acquire
land by purchase or eminent domain where the sole purpose is to
make it available for private uses.248 However, the fact that a pro-
ject, which serves a predominantly public purpose, may also result
in some incidental use or benefit to private interests does not strip
the proposed project of its public nature or necessitate a finding
that the public purpose requirement has been violated.2'
In addition to establishing that the taking is for a public pur-
pose, Florida also requires that the condemning authority show a
reasonable necessity that the particular property be taken for the
proposed use."0 Only that amount of property that is necessary for
245. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.012-.161 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
246. State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 885 (Fla. 1980).
247. E.g., id. at 886; State v. Housing Fin. Auth., 376 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1979).
248. E.g., Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d at 886; Baycol, Inc. v. Down-
town Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975).
249. E.g., Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d at 886; State v. Board of
Control, 66 So. 2d 209, 210-11 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami v. Coconut Grove Marine Proper-
ties, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 932 (1979). For
examples of the application of the public purpose requirement to specific projects, see, e.g.,
Baycol, Inc., 315 So. 2d at 457 (plan for parking garage and shopping mall dominated by
private uses because alleged public purpose of supplying parking was dependent on demand
created by privately owned and operated shops in mall); City of West Palm Beach v. State,
113 So. 2d 374, 377 (Fla. 1959) (a project consisting of a civic center and marina in which
proposed private shops were to serve the facility and the civic center was leased for opera-
tion by private enterprise was found to be predominantly for private use and benefit); Pan-
ama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 610, 614 (Fla. 1957) (fact that plan allowed some private
shops in proposed project consisting of several public buildings, two marinas and some con-
cession buildings did not deprive project of its public nature); State v. Daytona Beach Rac-
ing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34, 36-37 (Fla. 1956) (public purpose found
dominant in proposal for construction of racetrack and stadium to be operated by private
interests substantial portion of year because of entertainment value, promotion of tourism,
and provision for substantial public use).
250. FLA. STAT. § 73.021(1) (1981); Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So.
2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1972); City of Miami v. Cox, 313 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert.
denied, 330 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1976). The governmental authority does not have to prove an
absolute necessity for the taking of the particular property. Canal Auth. v. Litzel, 243 So. 2d
135, 137 (Fla. 1970); Dade County v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
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the proposed use may be acquired. 251 Florida also imposes a re-
quirement that the condemning authority have a good faith intent
to use the property, once acquired, for the proposed public
purpose.2 52
The most viable authority for the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain in the platted subdivisions appears to be in the Com-
munity Redevelopment Act, which confers powers on counties and
municipalities to be used to eliminate slum and blighted areas and
to take actions to prevent their recurrence.25
The vast majority of courts, including the United States Su-
preme Court, have upheld the constitutionality of urban redevel-
opment statutes authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent
domain to acquire property deemed a slum or suffering from
blighting conditions, as defined by statute, even though part or all
of the land acquired is ultimately to be turned over to private en-
terprise for development. In such cases, courts reason that the
elimination of such conditions constitutes a public purpose which
dominates any private benefit derived from redevelopment by pri-
vate interests. Condemning authorities may constitutionally take
property on an "area basis," including non-slum and non-blighted
structures and lots. Blighting conditions, which justify a taking by
eminent domain, may exist in primarily vacant and undeveloped
areas such as the platted lands. 54 However, the use of eminent do-
251. Canal Auth. v. Miller, 243 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1970).
An administrative determination that acquisition of certain land is reasonably necessary
is presumptively valid and will be upheld absent proof of bad faith, fraud, or gross abuse of
discretion. City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1977); Miller, 243 So. 2d
at 133. One lower court was very deferential, stating that it was "sufficient for a condemning
authority merely to establish that it properly exercised, in the procedural sense, its discre-
tionary powers under law. The burden then shifts to the landowner.. . to show either bad
faith or an abuse of that discretion." City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co., 352 So.
2d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The condemning authority is not required to demonstrate
an immediate need for the property or the proposed project. Paxson, 270 So. 2d at 458. Nor
is it necessary to have the funds, plans, specifications, and all other necessary preparations
ready as a condition to a proper determination of the necessity of the acquisition. Griffin,
346 So. 2d at 991 (quoting Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Wye River Farms, Inc.,
297 So. 2d 323, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)); City of Miami Beach v. Broida, 362 So. 2d 19, 20
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1979).
252. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1972). "How-
ever, a reservation of the right to abandon condemnation proceedings if the judgment is
beyond the financial capabilities of the condemning authority will not discredit an assertion
of good faith and necessity." Id.
253. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-.450 (1981) (amended 1983).
254. See, e.g., Cannata v. City of New York, 182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y.) (court approved
taking of primarily vacant land for industrial redevelopment under urban renewal statute),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962); H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE
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main to eliminate such conditions and reassemble land for redevel-
opment has primarily been restricted to urban areas.2 55
If the conditions existing in the platted subdivisions fall within
the definition of "blighted area,' 2 56 then the area, or some portion
thereof, may be acquired by eminent domain. Under Florida case
law, the acquisition could be for a public purpose even if the land
after replatting and development was made available for predomi-
nantly private uses, commercial as well as residential.'5 7
WHAT IS JUST COMPENSATION? Lot owners must be paid just
compensation for their land if taken by eminent domain. The gen-
eral rule in Florida is that landowners must be paid a sum which is
commensurate with the fair market value of the land. 58
FOR POucY-MAKES ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 188 (1974) (in cases involving
primarily undeveloped areas, elimination of blighting conditions that inhibit development,
such as unsound platting and clouded titles, found to be public purpose).
255. Florida was one of the last states to acknowledge that the elimination of slums and
blighted areas is a valid public purpose even when the acquired land is conveyed out to
private interests to redevelop. In 1938, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a legislative de-
termination that slum clearance and public construction of housing for persons of low in-
come served a public purpose. Marvin v. Housing Auth., 183 So. 145, 150 (Fla. 1938). How-
ever, in a subsequent case, the court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing housing
authorities to acquire property in blighted areas, by purchase or eminent domain, for the
purpose of redevelopment and then make it available to private commercial and industrial
interests. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 670 (Fla. 1952). In a later case, after
acknowledging that the public purpose underlying slum clearance and public housing was
well-established, the court began chipping away at the Adams decision by upholding a pro-
posal for clearance and redevelopment of a slum area resulting in primarily residential uses
and a few incidental private commercial uses. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.
2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1959).
In a recent opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Community Redevelopment
Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 163, "authorizing redevelopment projects involving expenditure of public
funds, sale of public bonds, the use of eminent domain for acquisition and clearance, and
substantial private and commercial uses after redevelopment, is in furtherance of a public
purpose and is constitutional." State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d at
875, 891 (Fla. 1980). The court quoted portions of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Berman, as persuasive on the issue of whether redevelopment of merely "blighted"
areas serves a public purpose and the issue whether the existence of private commercial uses
in the redeveloped area deprived the proposal of its public purpose. Id. at 889-91. The court
also noted that in a previous case dealing with ch. 163, Griffin, it had "implicitly held that
the use of eminent domain for slum clearance is constitutional even where the predominant
land use of the area will ultimately be private." Id. at 891.
256. See supra note 121.
257. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d at 891.
258. See Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 57 So. 351 (Fla. 1912) (measure of compen-
sation is the actual market value at the time of appropriation); but see Jacksonville Ex-
pressway Auth. v. Henry G. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1959) (fair market value is not
exclusive standard to be used to determine amount of compensation). See generally 21 FLA.
JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 84-97 (1980).
It may be possible, however, to consider the option of just compensation in other than
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There is no requirement in the Florida Constitution"' or the
general statutes dealing with eminent domain 260 specifying that
compensation must be paid in money. The majority of courts that
have considered the question have concluded that compensation
must be monetary,241 although at least one court has held that be-
cause the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
makes no reference to the medium of payment, it does not there-
fore require monetary compensation.262 It appears that in Florida
the condemning authority may not compel the landowner to accept
compensation in a form other than money, although it may be pos-
sible to offer the landowner a choice among nonmonetary and
monetary options.2
money. For example, if a government agency could acquire platted land and resell it for
alternative purposes while giving the initial condemnees a participation in the new use, it
may be a financially attractive eminent domain financing vehicle. Furthermore, if one as-
sumes that lot purchasers acquire their land for use or for investment, would it be feasible
to offer as just compensation some use option (such as an alternative site) or some invest-
ment option (such as a security interest plus right to a portion of appreciation in a new
development-much like a shared appreciation mortgage)? Or must there be a choice for
the condemnee, with at least a defensible monetary award provided as one of the options?
But even if that were feasible, litigation over value of proposed awards (cash or otherwise)
could create substantial legal costs. The actual value of many lots may prove to be substan-
tially less than the original purchase price, producing lot owner dissatisfaction with pro-
posed awards.
259. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). See supra note 234.
260. See FLA. STAT. §§ 73.012-74.121 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (amended 1983).
261. 3 C. NICHOLS, supra note 238, § 8.2, at 8-79. One basis for this conclusion is that
just compensation within the meaning of the fifth amendment and similar state constitu-
tional provisions has been judicially defined as the fair value of the property at the time of
the taking contemporaneously paid in money. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 191(c) (1965).
Under this view, the condemnor may not compel the condemnee to accept other land (even
though equal or greater in value), stocks, bonds, municipal warrants, or the use of the im-
provement for which the land was taken. 3 C. NICHOLS, supra note 238, § 8.2, at 8-82 to -83.
262. United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811, 819 (E.D.
Tenn. 1941).
263. Nonmonetary options may include TDRs, as discussed in text at Section III(D)(2),
under the subheading REASSEMBLY INDUCED BY TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, or
some participation in the new use, see supra note 258.
Nonmonetary benefits may be used to diminish the amount of damages or compensation
due to the condemnee in a taking situation under either eminent domain or a regulation
deemed to be a taking, such as deplatting or rezoning. In other words, the condemnor may
take less than the entire interest in the land by allowing the condemnee to retain certain
rights in the land or promising to perform some service for the condemnee and this will
serve to diminish the amount of money due to the condemnee. 3 C. NICHOLS, supra note
238, § 8.2, at 8-83. However, this is viewed only as mitigation, not a form of nonmonetary
compensation. The yielding of rights to the condemnee must take place before the adjudica-
tion of the right to condemn the land and the parties' relations become fixed. Id. at 8-83 to -
84. For instance, if the taking occurs and the proceeding is completed, the condemnor can-
not then mitigate by offering to stipulate to use the property to some lesser extent than the
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REDEVELOPMENT AFTER REASSEMBLY. Once funds are available
and land is acquired, redevelopment is the next step. Deplatted
land must be used for an alternative public purpose, similar to
conventional urban renewal. An express alternative use could in-
clude a redevelopment of the platted lands which meets modern
planning and design standards for residential, commercial or in-
dustrial development, or which produces a more "natural" use of
the land, such as agriculture, silvaculture, or cattlegrazing.
E. Restoring Some Areas in Whole or in Part to a Natural
Condition
1. Partial Restoration
Partial restoration of the platted lands may be achieved by plac-
ing weirs in or damming up selected canals, or by prohibiting sea-
wall construction. This would allow the land to "naturally" restore
itself. For areas of the subdivisions which come into public owner-
ship, this would be a low cost means to initiate partial restoration,
and there may be ways in which private landowners may also be
required to undertake certain remedial action.2"4
interest taken would allow or to give back rights or easements in the property as partial
payment of the compensation award.
If a less-than-fee interest is condemned, nonmonetary compensation in the form of special
benefits may be used to offset the amount due to the condemnee for the value of the inter-
est taken and any damages to the remainder. Potentially, this could reduce the amount to
zero. Apparently, there is a split of authority on the question of whether benefits to the
remainder may be set off against the condemnation award. Federal courts generally allow
special benefits to be offset, and still others allow both general and special benefits to be
offset. The Florida view on offset of benefits is found at FLA. STAT. § 73.071(4) (1981). This
section provides that the enhancement in value of the remainder may only be offset when
land is taken for a road, canal, levee, or water control facility right-of-way. Id. The Florida
courts have construed this provision to also require that the enhancement be direct and
peculiar to the condemnee's land, over and above that enjoyed by the neighboring property.
Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 854 (Fla. 1964); City of Jacksonville v. Yerkes,
282 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
264. Regulation can also play a role in restoration. If a restoration plan for an area
would also necessitate some remedial action by lot owners in the area, such as the construc-
tion of swales to minimize stormwater runoff, it may be feasible to require these actions of
each owner in the platted land area affected, either as an element of property transfer or
construction approval, or perhaps even as an affirmative duty without either transfer or
construction. An example of an affirmative duty is already provided by the grass cutting
requirement of the City of Cape Coral. The city requires the grass to be cut on vacant lots
and if it is not done (as it is impractical for distant lot owners to accomplish) the city
undertakes the work a block at a time with gang mowers and assesses the cost to the owners.
Thus, if the success of a restoration plan depended upon private lot owner action, it might
prove feasible for the local government to do the work if the owner failed to do it after
notice and within a reasonable time, and assess costs against the property owner. See gener-
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2. Full Restoration
The benefits to be gained by full restoration include enhanced
aquifier recharge and surface water supply, increased wildlife
habitat, and reduced desalination and contamination of water. Full
restoration would likely be the most expensive way to achieve
these benefits, and assumes that it is physically possible to return
certain portions of the platted lands to their original state. This
option would involve eminent domain as well as a significant man-
agement effort.
3. Financing Restoration
There is a possibility that some of the platted lands may be ac-
quired through state or federal programs. The principal programs
conducted by the State of Florida are the Conservation and Recre-
ation Lands Trust Fund26 5 or Land Acquisition Trust Fund.2 6 The
relevant federal programs 267 that may be applicable are through ei-
ther the Coastal Zone Management Act'" or the Watershed Pro-
tection and Flood Prevention Act.211
The State of Florida could possibly acquire certain environmen-
tally sensitive or recreationally related areas in the Charlotte Har-
ally 7 E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.561, at 546 (3d ed. 1981)
(in referring to nuisance abatement by the municipality on private property, "[a] right to
reimbursement and a lien on the real estate generally accrues to a municipality for its ex-
pense in rightfully demolishing a condemned building"); see also id. § 24.261 (the proce-
dures for abatement of nuisances relating to sewage and drainage are followed as with gen-
eral nuisances).
For such a requirement to be upheld, however, it would not only have to be based on the
overall restoration plan, but also be necessary to protect public health, safety or welfare. For
a discussion of the arguments which could be raised by lot owners, see the earlier discussion
of the taking issue. For a discussion of constitutional issues involving a requirement that
owners of property take specific action to protect the public health, safety and welfare, see
Baker, Enhancing the Visual Environment of the Twilight Commercial Zone: The Great
Neck Plaza Experiment, 2 HARv. ENvTL. L. Ruv. 389, 410-12 (1978).
265. FLA. STAT. § 253.023 (1981) (amended 1983).
266. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.02, 375.041 (1981) (amended 1983).
267. The primary research tool for determining state or local eligibility for funds to be
used for acquisition or development of lands is the CATALOG OF DOMESTIC AsSISTANCE, up-
dated through the use of the Federal Assistance Program Retrieval System (FAPRS). By
using the CATALOG, which describes the various federal assistance programs, a municipal or
county government may, through the use of a computer terminal or state access point, de-
termine a local, county, or state government's eligibility for the program under federal
guidelines.
268. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-538, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 145-1464 (Supp. V 1981)).
269. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954, ch. 656, 68 Stat. 666
(1954) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (Supp. V 1981)).
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bor area through either a Conservation and Recreation Trust Fund
grant (environmentally sensitive land) or through regular acquisi-
tion by the Division of Recreation and Parks (state parks, state
forests, etc.). 7 0
One federal program that may apply to the platted lands is the
Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act,27 1 a guaranteed
loan program administered through the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration. Under this program an applicant, such as a water manage-
ment district, would apply for improvement funds guaranteed by
the federal government for watershed flood prevention, drainage,
fish and wildlife development and water storage costs. The pro-
gram may be peripheral to direct acquisition of land for watershed
protection or flood control, but would be relevant for construction
270. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.023(3)(b), 259.035 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (amended 1983).
Fla. SB 632, passed in 1981, amended FLA. STAT. § 253.023 and provided a minimum of
$20,000,000 annually for a Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund to acquire land
primarily in environmentally sensitive and unique areas. Ch. 81-210, 1981 Fla. Laws 835, 836
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 253.023 (1981 & Supp. 1982)) (amended 1983). Municipal
governments, private groups, and individuals may apply, by a project proposal form, for
incorporation of a parcel of land into the annual acquisition priority selection process. FLA.
STAT. § 259.035 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (amended 1983).
A second statutory process through which the state could acquire the land for normal
park and recreation usage is through the $200,000,000 bond issue under the "Save Our
Coasts" program of which $50,000,000 is presently scheduled for sale. This will be over and
above the normal Division of Recreation & Parks budget, and the focus of acquisition in the
immediate future for these funds will be along the coast rather than interior park acquisi-
tion and development.
The issuance of any additional series of "Save Our Coasts" bonds, beyond the present
$50,000,000 authorized, may be a problem. The passage of Fla. HB 986 by the 1983 Legisla-
ture, which took effect June 1, 1983, requires the legislature to appropriate the first year's
debt service before any additional "Save Our Coasts" bonds may be issued. Ch. 83-57, 1983
Fla. Laws
Three recent amendments to ch. 253 improved the funding and the procedures for state
land acquisition. The first amendment, amending FLA. STAT. § 253.023 (1981), enlarged the
nature of items that could be included in state land acquisition grants. Funds from the
Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund can now also be used for title work, ap-
proval fees and survey costs related to lands to be acquired, donated or exchanged. Time
periods were also established for the initial acquisition negotiations (6 months) and final
closing of title (1 year from initiation of purchase negotiations). Ch. 82-152, 1982 Fla. Laws
441 (amended 1983). The second amendment, amending FLA. STAT. § 253.01 (1981), author-
ized the retention of proceeds from the sale of state-owned vacant land in the Internal Im-
provement Trust Fund, primarily for the acquisition, management, administration, protec-
tion and conservation of state-owned lands. Ch. 82-185, § 1, 1982 Fla. Laws 667. The third
amendment, Fla. HB 1209, substantially modified the procedures used to designate lands
and acquire such lands under the Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund, the Land
Acquisition Trust Fund, and the "Save Our Coasts" program. Ch. 83-114, 1983 Fla. Laws
- (amending FLA. STAT. § 253.023 (1981 & Supp. 1982)).
271. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (Supp. V 1981).
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of certain water facilities. 7 2 A second potential program is the Es-
tuarine Sanctuaries program of the Coastal Zone Management
Act.273 This program is designed to assist coastal states in the ac-
quisition, development and operation of estuarine sanctuaries, pri-
marily to study the interaction between natural and human activi-
ties in the coastal zone.27
The federal government presently is retreating from large direct
assistance to state governments for acquisition of land.2 76 For the
most part, funding for land acquisition by the federal government
is for the growth of existing federal parks and similar institutions.
The State of Florida recognizes the need for conserving environ-
mentally sensitive land, and the legislature has developed pro-
grams to meet that need. In determining the possibility of incorpo-
ration of any of the platted lands into the state public land
acquisition programs, it will be necessary for each respective local
government to show that it is either environmentally, historically,
or for other reasons, important to maintain or return the land to
its natural state.
F. Government/Developer Negotiation
Many of the platted lands developers have a continuing interest
in the subdivisions because of lots in inventory, lots under contract
for deed, lots subject to continued developer commitments to pro-
vide purchasers certain services, or areas owned by and to be built
by the developers. These developers have a sufficient enough stake
in the outcome of any plan for the platted lands that they may be
willing to undertake voluntary action either to forestall more re-
strictive public action or to take advantage of new development
opportunities.
272. The Fiscal Year 1982 federal budget for the program is $26,000,000 for the entire
United States.
273. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. V 1981).
274. Nationwide, the program will develop twenty to thirty sites. In Florida, Rookery
Bay is presently such a sanctuary. The program supplies up to $50,000 for pre-acquisition
work (research and related) prior to formal acquisition by the state or local organization.
The agency works very closely with state conservation agencies prior to formal application
for a sanctuary. However, only a total of $1,280,000 is budgeted for the entire United States
for Fiscal Year 1983.
275. Reviewed for this report was the possibility of obtaining funds through the Land
and Water Conservation Fund. This program provides direct grants to state agencies in-
volved in developing statewide planning and conservation programs and also for land acqui-
sition. However, as of Fiscal Year 1982, the program was amended to provide for federal
land acquisition only, with no funds budgeted for assistance to the states for land
acquisition.
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For example, a voluntary assembly program might be designed
to foster the deed restriction or dedication to the public of contigu-
ous lots in return for the ability to cluster the density allowed on
only a portion of the assembled parcel. It may also be feasible to
make attractive the purchase of selected scattered lots and their
deed restriction or dedication to the public in return for the ability
to transfer the allowed density to a non-contiguous parcel. It may
even be possible to encourage the purchase of residential lots to
mitigate the impact of more intensive development elsewhere
within the subdivision.
Once the planning effort is complete, the local governments of
the Charlotte Harbor area may find it useful to talk with some or
all of these developers about ways they can jointly work toward
accomplishing the defined public goals.
The lot purchasers should not be neglected either. While much
more numerous and therefore more difficult to negotiate with, they
may be very willing to consider new options for the use of their lots
if properly approached.
Many lot purchasers have found themselves the owners of real
estate beyond the area of foreseeable significant development and
the area for public facilities and services. Many have paid for prop-
erty which effectively cannot be used for years, and because of the
large number of similar lots available, there is no realistic resale
market. Or, they have in fact bought lots which because of environ-
mental restrictions are unbuildable or capable of being built out
only after expenditures beyond the value of the land. Finally,
many lot purchasers bought their property for investment, only to
find no purchasers from whom they can recoup even their initial
investment. These individuals may be willing to consider suitable
offers from developers responding to an incentive program.
In any event, the purpose of this discussion about negotiation is
to serve as a reminder that negotiation as well as direct action can
result in desired changes to platted lands build-out patterns.
IV. A CLOSING COMMENT
As the reader will no doubt have perceived from the foregoing
discussion, the choice of appropriate legal responses to the platted
lands problems cannot be made without good information about
the scope and depth of the problems themselves. It may be helpful
to offer a few general guidelines, however, assuming some level of
response.
First, the county governments need to initially decide whether
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the platted lands, especially the five large subdivisions, are going to
become areas in which they want new building to occur or whether
the governments desire new building to take place outside the plat-
ted lands. For example, other jurisdications have decided to en-
courage building in areas already developed because many of the
road and utility systems were in place, and more building there
meant more open land saved at the fringe. In short, the platted
lands may provide the three county area with an opportunity as
well as a challenge.
Second, if there is a need to have much of the platted lands re-
main unbuilt, the counties need to decide whether those portions
can be committed to a desirable alternative use.2 76
Third, assuming some development is desired in part, some non-
development in part, and some timed development in part, how do
the counties achieve these goals? A rezoning to lower density in-
volves enough obstacles that it may prove feasible for lots in uni-
tary ownership, but given the relatively small percentage of lots
still in that category, especially if deductions are made for lots
under contract for deed, a large-scale rezoning may not produce
enough "return" to be worth the trouble, though even a "small"
return in an area as large as the platted lands may involve sizeable
parcels of land.
On the other hand, a special permit process, tied either to envi-
ronmental constraints or availability of public services, and linked
to appropriate impact fees, may help guide the growth that does
take place to more appropriate locations.
That would still leave, however, some areas that are undesirable
for single-family development. At the moment they may individu-
ally have scant value. But if certain areas were targeted for more
intensive development or more feasible single-family development,
the lots in those areas might be recombined, either through emi-
nent domain, deplatting, or lot pooling, where feasible, in part be-
cause the resulting parcel would have development value to reim-
burse the acquisition and recombination costs. Rezoned, they
might even be attractive enough to provide a receiving district for
transferable development rights from owners of parcels which
should not be built on at all.
Next, there may still be some lots that will either require resto-
276. Land and water rich Floridians, by relative standards, may not notice it, but visi-
tors from more crowded regions of the country marvel at the amount of parkland the plat-
ted lands could provide.
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ration or preservation. Here, the counties may need to resort to
purchase or eminent domain as a sure vehicle to accomplish the
job, though regulatory options may need consideration.
Finally, the police power can prove broad and elastic, especially
in the face of a strong need and a situation as unusual as the plat-
ted lands. But there may be situations to which the long arm of
the law, at least as far as the counties may be willing to extend it,
may not reach. In those cases, negotiation with developers and
owners of individual lots may prove fruitful.2
The foregoing discussion has outlined the options and some of
the legal issues they raise. But the massive lot sale subdivision is a
twentieth century interstate land marketing innovation that the
law and legal institutions have only begun to address. For example,
developers must now under state and federal law make full disclos-
ure to buyers of the characteristics of the property and the com-
mitments for improvements.27 8 Also, Florida itself has undertaken
to prevent new lot sale subdivisions from creating some of the
same problems with its development of a regional impact review
277. During the research on this article, the authors discussed possible management ap-
proaches which could be used to handle platted lands issues in the Charlotte Harbor area.
These discussions were free-flowing examinations of how existing regional approaches could
be modified to address the situations in Charlotte Harbor.
The authors reviewed the purposes and structure of such regional agencies as the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission; the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency; the Minneapolis-St. Paul Twin Cities Metropolitan Council; the New York
Adirondack Park Agency; the Massachusetts Martha's Vineyard Commission; the New
Jersey Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission; and the New Jersey Pinelands
Commission. When these approaches were distilled, and when Florida law was examined,
what emerged was the suggestion of a three county community redevelopment agency, FLA.
STAT. §§ 163.330-.450 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (amended 1983), with financial capacity of a
community development district, FLA. STAT. ch. 190 (1981 & Supp. 1982), which would work
with the state and the SWFRPC in the study and examination of the specific problems of
the area and in the establishment of goals for the area. Once this was done, this new agency
would prepare a plan to address the problems identified and to meet desired goals, and
would have the authority to implement the plan subject to home-rule limitations.
This new agency could have a commission made up of the Governor and county commis-
sion appointees, and an advisory municipal committee made up of representatives of the
municipalities within the agency's jurisdiction. To deal with the concern of tax revenue from
new development, a tax-base sharing program could be established.
Since it was beyond the scope of this article, no attempt has been made to flesh out these
ideas. For those who are interested in looking at this concept in greater detail, review of the
Florida statutes cited above and the enabling legislation of the regional agencies mentioned
will provide the sufficient "food for thought." The legislation for the Hackensack Meadow-
lands Development Commission, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17-1 to -86 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982),
would be a good place to begin research. See also Grant, Turning it Around in the Hacken-
sack Meadowlands, 35 Uaa. LAND 15 (1976).
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requirement.2 79 Consequently, the legal rules that arose in other
contexts will provide guidance to action but not necessarily con-
trolling authority. As stated earlier, the size of the platted lands,
the problems they may prove to present, and the unusual nature of
massive lot sale development may reshape the legal doctrine that
might otherwise apply.
Therefore, while the Charlotte Harbor platted lands may not
constitute an area of national significance, such as the Everglades
or the Big Cypress Swamp, nor even an area of state significance
such as the Green Swamp or the Florida Keys, the future of these
platted lands matters a great deal. Not only does the future matter
to the people who live there, and to those in the wider Charlotte
Harbor region, but it also matters to outsiders. What happens to
the platted lands is likely to have an impact far beyond Charlotte
Harbor as many jurisdictions throughout Florida and the country
wrestle with what to do about the large lot sale subdivisions in
their own backyards.
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